The Trial of the Argentine Junta: Responsibilities and Realities by Speck, Paula K.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
4-1-1987
The Trial of the Argentine Junta: Responsibilities
and Realities
Paula K. Speck
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paula K. Speck, The Trial of the Argentine Junta: Responsibilities and Realities, 18 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 491 (1987)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol18/iss3/3




II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 495
III. THE TRIAL AND THE OPINION 500
A. Pre-Trial Maneuvering 500
B. The Trial 502
C. The Opinion 504
1. Preliminary Questions 504
2. Governmental Responsibility 504
3. Evidence Linking the Junta with Subordi-
nates' Actions 505
4. Affirmative Defenses 506
5. Command Responsibility 509
6. The Verdict 512
D. Subsequent Developments 513
* J.D. University of Texas Law School, 1986; Law Clerk to Judge Sam D. Johnson of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The author earned a Ph.D in Latin American literature
from Yale University in 1978.
The author wishes to thank Mary Speck, who worked as a reporter in Buenos Aires
during the time of the trial, for providing this massive (several thousand page) opinion, as
well as many newspaper clippings and valuable insights. Professor Guillermo Margadant,
while visiting at the University of Texas Law School, provided an essential overview of the
nature and structure of Latin American legal systems; this article derives from a paper
originally written for his seminar in Latin American Law. The author spent several months
in Argentina in 1976, doing research for a dissertation in 20th-century literature, and her
assessment of the social and political atmosphere during the first months of the "dirty war"
derives partly from this experience. Unless otherwise specified, all newspapers cited in this
article are published in Buenos Aires, and all translations from Spanish or Portuguese into
English are the work of the author.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
IV. A BRIEF COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF RESPONSIBILITY IN
MILITARY HIERARCHIES 517
A. International Law: The Nuremburg Trials 517
B. United States Law 518








V. Two THORNY PROBLEMS 526
A. Subordinate Responsibility 526
B. Command Responsibility 529
VI. CONCLUSION 531
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 9, 1985, a civilian court in Argentina, the
Cimara Federal de Apelaciones en lo Criminal (the C~mara), con-
demned members of two previous military juntas to prison for
human rights violations carried out by their subordinates.' The
prosecution accused nine generals and admirals of crimes ranging
from aggravated homicide, torture and illegal deprivation of liberty
to falsification of public documents and cover-ups.2 The sheer
1. La Ctimara Federal dict6 sentencia, La Raz6n, Dec. 10, 1985, at 1, col. 1 special
supp.; Mixed Reaction to junta uerdicts, Buenos Aires Herald, Dec. 10, 1985, at 1; La
sentencia de La C mara Federal: Parte dispositiva del veredicto, La Naci6n, Dec. 10, 1985,
at 16, col. 1; Causa originalmente instruida par el Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas
en cumplimiento del Decreto 158/83 del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional [P.E.N.], Dec. 9, 1985,
aff'd, Dec. 30, 1986, Carte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [C.J.N.], Jurisprudencia Argen-
tina [J.A.] [hereinafter Junta Opinion] (official photocopy obtained from the Cimara Na-
cional de Apelaciones en lo Criminal y Correccional Federal); see Confirmb la Carte la
Sentencia de la Cdmara; La Naci6n, Jan. 5, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
2. Los delitos imputados por la Fiscalia a cada procesado, La Naci6n, Dec. 10, 1985, at
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number of crimes in the trial strained the resources of the court to
the breaking point: of approximately 9,000 cases of "disappear-
ances" documented by a national commission, the prosecution
chose the 700 most representative and provable cases. The taking
of testimony extended over six months and was avidly followed by
the Argentine press and those lucky enough to get seats in the
courtroom.' Despite fears that the proceeding would turn into a
circus or show trial,' the court succeeded in maintaining order and
judicial procedures, and the verdict gave neither the prosecution
nor the defense all that they had asked for.'
The Cdmara is not the first court to grapple with the task of
judging military officers for violations of human rights committed
in an atmosphere of war or internal unrest. Historic precedents in-
clude the trial of Henry Wirz, confederate commander of the noto-
rious Andersonville Prison Camp;' the Nuremberg trials of Nazi
officers;8 the trial of Japanese General Yamashita after the fall of
the Phillipines in World War II;9 the trials of Lieutenant Calley
and Captain Medina for the massacre at My Lai in Vietnam;' 0 and
the trial of the Greek "colonels" after the fall of their junta in
1974.11
16, col. 1; Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,599-629, 28,730.
3. The report of the Comisi6n Nacional sobre Ia Desaparicibn de Personas
(CONADEP), headed by novelist Ernesto Sdbato, has been published as NUNCA MAs (12th
ed. 1986) [hereinafter NUNCA MAs].
4. Ante una sala colmada y tensa: La culminacidn de un proceso que comenz6 hace
dos aftos, La Naci6n Dec. 10, 1985, at 10, col. 3.
5. See La Cdmara respondi6 a versiones que tergiversan el juicio a las ex juntas,
Clarin, Apr. 9, 1985, at 5, col. 1; Massera hizo advertencias at terminar el alegato de su
defensa, Clarin, Oct. 4, 1985, at 2, col. 4; Agosti calific6 de "arbitrarias" las acusaciones que
se le imputan, Clarin, Oct. 8, 1985, at 8, col. 4; Viola's Lawyers Say Court Biased, Buenos
Aires Herald, Oct. 12, 1985, at 1.
6. The court absolved four of the accused - the members of the third junta, the air
force representative in the second junta, and the five convicted officers received lower
sentences than the prosecution had requested. Penas pedidas y condenas, La Naci6n Dec.
10, 1985; Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 29,832-37. The verdict aroused strong reactions
from both pro-junta and human rights groups. Praise, Harsh Criticism: Mixed Reaction to
Junta Verdicts, Buenos Aires Herald, Dec. 10, 1985, at 1, col. 9.
7. H.R. Exac. Doc. No. 23, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., voL 8 (1867-68).
8. Of the voluminous literature on these trials, a good introduction can be found in R.
WoEnZEL. THE NUREM13ERG TRiALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1960).
9. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
10. Instructions to the Jury in the Court Martial of William L. Calley, Jr., and Instruc-
tions to the Jury in the Court Martial of Ernest L. Medina, reprinted in 2 THE LAW OF WAR:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1703-37 (L. Friedman ed., 1972) [hereinafter L. Freidman].
11. T. THEODORACOPULOS, THE GREEK UPHEAVAL: KINGS, DEMoGoGUES, AND BAYONETS
246-54 (1978); R. CLOOG, A SHORT HISTOv OF MODERN GREECE 208-09 (1979).
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The Argentine junta trial, however, differs from these prece-
dents in several important ways. First, the Nazis, Wirz, and
Yamashita were representatives of a defeated power tried by vic-
tors immediately after winning the war;12 the Argentine junta won
its "dirty war" against subversion.1" Second, the accusations at Nu-
remberg were based on international law, and raised serious ques-
tions as to whether the crimes prosecuted there were created by
the tribunal.14 The Argentine CAmara applied only national crimi-
nal laws in existence during the period in which the accused held
power." Third, the Greek parliament set the stage for trial of the
Colonel's junta by declaring the coup and the entire government it
spawned illegal. "6 The Colonels were then tried, not only for con-
ventional crimes committed during their tenure, but also for the
acts of taking and holding power from 1967 to 1974.11 In addition
to verging on the prejudgment of a judicial case by the legislature,
this procedure raised questions about the power of one government
to selectively repudiate the acts of its predecessor.' The Argentine
court, in contrast, steered clear of judging the legitimacy of the
junta as a government or its decision to combat subversion; the
CAmara confined itself to judging the defendants for the commis-
sion of well-established crimes and struggled to make the proceed-
ing resemble an average criminal trial.'9
Nevertheless, the high rank of the accused officers and the
magnitude of the crimes for which they were prosecuted assured
that this would be an unusual trial. Indeed, the juicio del siglo
(trial of the century) raised fundamental questions about the
courts' ability to deal with crimes using a governmental organiza-
tion as an instrument and taking a large segment of society as ac-
complices and victims. Given that the court is created by a govern-
ment, is the court competent to handle society-wide crimes? And if
12. See supra notes 7-9.
13. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
14. See R. WOLTZEL, supra note 8, at 111-17, 171, 238.
15. N. MONTENEGRO, SERA JUSTICIA: JULIO CESAR STRASSERA, Luis GABRIEL MORENO
OCAMPO: ENTREVISTAS 19 (1986) (contains interviews by a journalist with the prosecutors in
the junta trial). See also La comparaci6n con Nurenberg no tiene asidero, La Raz6n, Apr.
18, 1985, at 24, col. 1.
16. See T. THEODORACOPULOS, supra note 11; R. CLOGG, supra note 11.
17. T. THEODORACOPULOS, supra note 11; R. CLOOG, supra note 11.
18. For example, T. Theodoracopulos points out that, if the Colonel's government was
illegal, then so were marriages celebrated during its tenure, pension checks that it paid out,
and all its civil service appointments, including those of some of the judges and prosecutors
involved in the case. T. THEODORACOPUOS, supra note 11, at 244.
19. See in/ra notes 88-102, 144-46 and accompanying text.
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not, can other branches of government deal with the complexities
of society-wide crimes, or must such crimes go unpunished? Would
political solutions work better?
This article will provide a basis for addressing these difficult
questions. The article first describes the historical and procedural
background of the trial, summarizes the C~mara's methodology
and findings, and touches on subsequent developments. It then
surveys attempts by other legal systems to deal with similar
problems, and discusses two questions raised by the trial: to what
extent should subordinates be held responsible for acts planned
and ordered by superiors; and to what extent should superiors be
held responsible for the acts of subordinates.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
After winning its independence from Spain in the early nine-
teenth century, Argentina experienced an alternating pattern of
dictatorship and anarchy similar to that suffered by other Latin
American nations.2 0 In the 1860's this changed when the country
settled into a constitution and a set of stable institutions that fos-
tered economic growth, urbanization, and high immigration for five
decades. Consequently, in the 1920's, Argentina enjoyed a homoge-
nous, educated population of European origin, a strong economy,
and a stable constitution protecting individual rights. In 1930,
however, a handful of generals took advantage of the onslaught of
the Great Depression and weaknesses of the civilian regime and
took over the government. Fifteen years of military rule punc-
tuated by fitful attempts to restore democracy followed. In 1945,
Juan Domingo Per6n, a charismatic former general who had at-
tracted labor union support, wrested control from his colleagues.
Per6n's movement, which had both fascist and leftist elements and
rested on his and his wife Evita's populist appeal, trampled on civil
rights, and left the economy in shambles. In 1955, a revolution
supported by Argentina's middle class, Britain, France, and the
United States, overthrew Per6n. Throughout the rest of the 1950's
and 1960's, military and civilian governments alternatively failed
to solve Argentina's economic problems and were unable to win the
20. Information on Argentine history up to 1970 can be found in H. HERRING, LATIN
AmAmCA: FROM THE BEGINNINGS TO THE PRESENT 693-785 (1972); A. WHITAKER. ARGENTINA




support of Per6n's working class followers. A number of under-
ground leftist groups sprang up and carried out spectacular assas-
sinations and kidnappings for ransom.21
By the early 1970's, the military government, under General
Alejandro Lanusse, announced free elections in which all parties,
including the Peronists, but excluding Per6n, could take part.22
Hector J. C6.mpora, a Peronist hack, ran for election under the slo-
gan Cdmpora al gobierno, Per6n al poder! (Ciumpora to the Gov-
ernment, Per6n to Power!), and promised to turn power over to
Per6n himself. In March, 1973, CAmpora won; in July, he resigned
and called new elections; by October, Juan Domingo Per6n was re-
instated in the Casa Rosada, with his third wife, Maria Estela
("Isabelita") as Vice President.23 The new government passed an
amnesty law for those accused of politically-motivated terrorism,
hoping that the movements would wither away under a populist
government.2 However, it soon became clear that the fascist and
antisemitic tendencies of the Peronist right wing movement domi-
nated the government.25 Per6n, old and sick, delegated most of his
power to his wife and her closest advisor (and by rumor, her lover),
Jos6 L6pez Rega, the Minister of Public Welfare.2 6 Left-wing ter-
rorism resurged, to be met by brutal repression from the govern-
ment and government-backed para-military groups such as the
Alianza Anticommunista Argentina (AAA).2 1 When Per6n died on
July 1, 1974, Isabelita, lacking education and the natural charisma
of Evita, increasingly relied on L6pez Rega who, rumor had it, gov-
erned according to astrological signs.28 When the military forced
21. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,305-27.
22. Argentina: Who's Winning?, Latin Am., Dec. 22, 1972, at 402, col. 2; Argentina:
This Year, Next Year, Sometime, Latin Am., Jan. 12, 1973, at 14, col. 1.
23. Argentina: Power to Per~n, Latin Am., Mar. 16, 1973, at 81, col. 1; Argentina: Con-
ciliation, Latin Am., May 25, 1973, at 167, col. 1; Argentina: Through the Looking Glass,
Latin Am., July 20, 1973, at 225, col. 2; Argentina: Victory Challenged, Latin Am., Sept. 28,
1973, at 305, col. 1; Argentina: President Per6n, Latin Am., Oct. 19, 1973, at 330, col. 2.
24. Law 20,508, May 27, 1973, 1973-A Anuario de Legislaci6n [A.L.J.A.] 605. For an
analysis of relations between the Cmpora government and the guerrilleros, see Argentina:
Guerrillas Under the Throne, Latin Am., June 15, 1973, at 190, col. 1.
25. Argentina: Hop, Skip, and Jump, Latin Am., Dec. 21, 1973, at 401, col. 1; Argen-
tina: Per6n Puts On His Uniform, Latin Am., Jan. 25, 1974, at 25, col. 1; Argentina: Water-
shed, Latin Am., Feb. 1, 1974, at 39, col, 1.
26. Argentina: Cultural Revolution, Latin Am., Mar. 1, 1974, at 66, col. 2; Argentina:
Versions of the Truth, Latin Am., Mar. 22, 1974, at 93, col. 1; Argentina: Struggle, Latin
Am., Apr. 12, 1974, at 119, col, 1; Argentina: Not Dead But Travelling, Latin Am., May 3,
1974, at 130, col. 1.
27. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,328-31.
28. Argentina: The Deluge, Latin Am., July 5, 1974; Argentina: Triple Crisis, Latin
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L6pez Rega into exile, President Per6n spent weeks in her resi-
dence refusing to meet with her advisors. Inflation reached over
300%. Violence between the left and right factions increased, and
leftist guerrillas in the rural province of Tucumfn threatened to
capture and hold territory.3
On March 24, 1976, the Armed Forces which had announced
that they would take over the government, carried out their prom-
ise.30 It is important to note that this coup took place in an atmo-
sphere of national emergency, with wide civilian support. President
Isabelita de Per6n headed a constitutional government, but she
had not been elected, and proved to be an incompetent leader. The
Peronist government had already declared a state of seige, sus-
pended many civil liberties, and turned over the responsibility for
combatting internal subversion to the Armed Forces. 1 The first
junta, composed of Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael Videla of the
Army, Admiral Emilio Massera of the Navy, and Brigadier General
Orlando Ram6n Agosti of the Air Force, merely had to intensify
the dirty war that it had commenced against leftist terrorism.
33
Am., Aug. 16, 1974, at 254, col. 1; Argentina: Eminence Noire, Latin Am., Aug. 23, 1974, at
260, col. 2; Argentina: The Dialectic of Bombs and Machine Guns, Latin Am., Sept. 27,
1974, at 300, col. 1; Argentina: State of Seige, Latin Am., Nov. 15, 1974, at 357, col. 1;
Argentina: Last Trump, Latin Am., Nov. 22, 1974, at 367, col. 1; Argentina: Balancing Act,
Latin Am., Dec. 20, 1974, at 398, col. 1; Argentina: The Queen's Chief Minister, Latin Am.,
Jan. 10, 1975, at 12, col. 2; Argentina: Army Joins In, Latin Am., Feb. 14, 1975, at 52, col. 2;
Argentina: Can It Endure?, Latin Am., Mar. 28, 1975, at 103, col. 1; Argentina: Swastikas
Over the Andes, Latin Am., May 9, 1975, at 140, col. 1; Argentina: Anticommunists Anony-
mous, Latin Am., June 6, 1975, at 172, col. 1.
29. Argentina: Ending or Beginning, Latin Am., Feb. 21, 1975, at 57, col. 2; Argentina:
Vandor's Hour Has Struck, Latin Am., July 18, 1975, at 217, col. 1; Argentina: One-Way
Ticket, Latin Am., July 25, 1975, at 226, col. 1; Argentina: 20 Years On, Latin Am., Aug. 22,
1975, at 261, col. 1; Argentina: Shaking the Kaleidoscope, Latin Am., Sept. 5, 1975, at 277,
col. 2; Argentina: Men at Arms, Latin Am., Sept. 12, 1975, at 282, col. 1; Argentina: Brew-
ing the Next Crisis, Latin Am., Sept. 19, 1975, at 289, col. 1; Argentina: Return of the
Unwanted, Latin Am., Oct. 17, 1975, at 321, col. 1; Argentina: Hie Thee to a Nunnery,
Latin Am., Nov. 7, 1975, at 349, col. 2; Argentina: No Coup, Latin Am., Nov. 14, 1975, at
357, col. 1; Argentina: Guerrilla Struggle, Latin Am., Nov. 28, 1975, at 370, col. 1; Argen-
tina: Massacre or Negotiation, Latin Am., Dec. 12, 1975, at 386, col. 1; Argentina: Drifting
Into Civil War, Latin Am., Feb. 6, 1976, at 45, col. 1.
30. Argentina: Operation Cross the Road, Latin Am., Feb. 13, 1976, at 54, col. 1; Ar-
gentina: Coup Still at the Planning Stage, Latin Am., Mar. 5, 1976, at 73, col. 2; Argentina:
At Last, Latin Am., Mar. 26, 1976, at 97, col. 1; Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,343.
31. The C lmara reviews many laws passed by the Peronist government and its succes-
sor that have increased the powers of the military and reduced the legal rights of suspected
terrorists. See Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,333-43.
32. Control passed through three juntas that were comprised of the commanders-in-
chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, with the Army commander assuming the Presi-
dency. The dates of control for each junta member are set forth in the following table.
1987]
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During this war it is estimated between 9,000 and 15,000 suspected
leftists disappeared."
Each disappearance followed a similar pattern. Civilian au-
thorities, such as the police, were told not to interfere in a certain
targeted area. An armed unit would burst into the victim's house
or apartment in the early hours of the morning; the attackers car-
ried off the victim in an unmarked car, often ransacking the house,
and always warning family members that appeals to the authorities
would be useless. The attackers then drove the victim, usually with
a hood over his head, to a clandestine detention center where they
questioned him or her, usually with torture.3 4 Victims were held
incommunicado and warned not to expect any help from the au-
thorities or their families. Family members were also kidnapped
and often tortured in each other's presence."
Some prisoners were detained for years; others were tortured
to death. Most, however, simply "disappeared," prompting the in-
vention of a new transitive verb, "to disappear someone." Bodies
were found floating in the Rio de la Plata or buried in mass graves,
often with hands and heads cut off to prevent identification. 6
Many of those who died as a result of torture or executions in de-
tention centers were reported by the military, which had instituted
press controls, as casualties of "confrontations" between the forces
of order and armed bands.3 7 Relatives of the missing filed hun-
dreds of habeas corpus petitions and appealed to Argentine and
other authorities, but to no avail.3  Victims included the elderly,
Army Navy Air Force
Junta I Videla Massera Agosti
3/24/76 to 7/31/78 3/24/76 to 9/15/78 3/24/76 to 1/25/79
Junta 2 Viola Lambruschini Graffigna
7/31/78 to 12/28/81 9/15/78 to 9/12/81 1/25/79 to 12/17/81
Junte 3 Galtieri Anaya Lami Dozo
12/28/81 to 6/18/82 9/12/81 to 10/1/82 12/17/81 to 8/17/82
Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,343-44. The opinion erroneously gives the year of the
Viola-Galtieri transition as 1979 rather than 1981. See Galtieri Takes Presidency and Re-
tains Control of Army, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Dec. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
33. The CONADEP documented 8,961 disappearances, but estimated that thousands
more had occurred. NUNCA MAs, supra note 3, at 10, 293.
34. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,349-417; NUNCA Mks, supra note 3, at 16-26.
35. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,417-23, 28,427-47; NUNCA MAs, supra note 3, at
26-54.
36. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,448-71; NUNCA MAs, supra note 3, at 223-47.
37. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,464-66; NUNCA Mks, supra note 3, at 229-32.
38. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,473-93; NUNCA MAs, supra note 3, at 400-07.
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children and pregnant women; Argentines, Uruguayans, and citi-
zens of other nations; students, workers, journalists, lawyers,
priests, and former cabinet ministers.3 9 Many victims disappeared,
not because they were suspected of aiding terrorist activities, but
because it was hoped that they would denounce family members
who had, or because they had submitted habeas corpus petitions or
had participated in human rights organizations. " Amid growing in-
ternational censure, the junta denied committing any violations.'1
A second junta, consisting of Lieutenant General Eduardo Vi-
ola (Army), Admiral Armando Lambruschini (Navy), and Briga-
dier General Omar Graffigna (Air Force), took power in mid-
1978.42 The junta announced that the war against subversion had
been won, and disappearances dropped off sharply.' s However, in-
flation remained high, the national debt had mushroomed, and pa-
triotic sentiments were irritated by border incidents with Chile."
These problems worsened under the third junta headed by Lieu-
tenant General Leopoldo Galtieri, Admiral Jorge Anaya, and Brig-
adier General Basilio Lami Dozo which took power at the end of
1981. '5 Partly to provide a distraction from the growing unrest, the
third junta launched an ill-advised invasion of the Malvinas (Falk-
land) Islands in April 1982.11 By June, the invasion ended in disas-
ter and General Galtieri resigned. " A caretaker junta prepared for
civilian elections, and in October 1983, Radl Alfonsin of the Uni6n
Civica Radical (a middle-class party) was elected president."
Before leaving office, the junta passed a law, ostensibly to benefit
39. NUNCA MAs, supra note 3, at 293-390. Among those who disappeared were Edgardo
Saj6n, the former Press Secretary of ex-President Alejandro Lanusse, Junta Opinion, supra
note 1, at 28,604-05, Jacobo Timerman, publisher of the daily La Opini6n id at 29,020-22,
Hip6lito Solari Yrigoyen, an ex-Senator, id. at 28,884-88 and Elena Holmberg, a diplomat,
id. at 29,700-07.
40. NUNCA MAs, supra note 3, at 332-41, 424-29.
41. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,483-93.
42. Id. at 28,343-44.
43. Id. at 28,349.
44. Alemann's Austerity Plan Brings Reaganomics to Buenos Aires. Latin Am. Weekly
Rep. Jan. 8, 1982, at 1, col. 1; In brief: Argentina/Chile, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Feb. 19,
1982, at 11, col. 1; Argentina: Shaking Hands and Kissing Babies, Latin Am. Weekly Rep.,
Feb. 26, 1982, at 6, col. 2.
45. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,343-44. See sources cited supra note 44.
46. Crisis in the South Atlantic: Steaming Into Battle, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Apr. 9,
1986, at 1, col. 1; Stroke of Genius or Fatal Gamble?, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Apr. 9, 1986,
at 11, col. 1.
47. Military Defeat Hammers Last Nail Into Galtieri's Political Coffin, Latin Am.
Weekly Rep., June 18, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
48. All the President's Men, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Nov. 4, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
1987]
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the families of the disappeared, shortening the period necessary for
a declaration of "legal death,"' 9 and providing general amnesty for
those involved in the "dirty war.
50
III. THE TRIAL AND THE OPINION
A. Pre-Trial Maneuvering
Three days after his inauguration in December 1983, President
Alfonsin promulgated a decree ordering the Consejo Supremo
Militar (the Consejo) (the military's highest court) to try the mem-
bers of the first three juntas for crimes against human rights such
as illegal deprivation of liberty, torture, and homicide."' The de-
cree provided that both prosecution and defense could appeal to
the Cimara Federal; if the Consejo failed to reach a verdict in six
months, the CAmara could either grant an extension or take the
case and try it de novo.2 To further guard against delaying tactics,
the decree mandated that the Consejo and CAmara follow an expe-
dited procedure provided for in the C6digo Militar as juicio
sumario en tiempo de paz (summary trial in peace time).5 3 On the
same day, the President announced the prosecution of heads of the
major leftist guerrilla groups, and the submission to Congress of
bills reducing military jurisdiction and criminalizing coups d'6tat.5 '
In September 1984, the Consejo reported to the CAmara that
49. Law 22,062, Aug. 28, 1979, 1979-C Anales de Legislaci6n Argentina [hereinafter
A.D.L.A.] 2485. The Law allowed relatives of disappeared persons to apply for benefits after
only one year.
50. Law 22,924, Sept. 22, 1983, 1983-D A.D.L.A. 3830. For a finding that this Law is
unconstitutional, see Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,286, and precedents cited therein.
This Law and its context are discussed in Snyder, State of Seige and Rule of Law in Argen-
tina: The Politics and Rhetoric of Vindication, 15 LAw. AM. 503 (1984).
51. Decree 158/83, Dec. 15, 1983, 1983-B A.D.L.A. 1943. This decree was sanctioned by
the Argentine Congress in Law 23,049, Feb. 9, 1984, 1984-A A.D.L.A. 8 (amending the
C6DIGO DE JUSTICIA MILiTAR), reprinted in C6DIGG DE JUSTICA MILITAR (C6D. Jus. MiL.) 427-
32 (0. Igounet & 0. Igounet eds. 1985).
52. See supra note 51.
53. C61. Jus. MIL. arts. 502-504 bis.
54. Decree 157/83, Dec. 15, 1983, 1983-B A.D.L.A. 1941; El presidente anuncib medidas
para reimplantar el estado de derecho; Sanciones por el golpe de estado; Reformas de
fondo, Clarin, Dec. 14, 1983, at 4, col. 1. The Argentine Constitution forbids ex post facto
criminal laws, CONsTITucI6N DE LA NACI6N art 18; CONsTrrucl6N DE LA NAC16N ARGENTINA 61
(H. Zarini ed. 1975), but allows procedural changes to be applied to cases arising before
their passage. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,285-86. Thus, the juntas were not accused
of perpetrating an illegal coup, but the procedural changes contained in Law 23,039 were
applied in their human rights trial.
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it found all the orders issued by accused junta members during the
dirty war unobjectionable. 5 The Consejo declared that the defend-
ants could only be accused for negligence in failing to control their
subordinates.5" The Consejo also protested the short period of time
allowed by juicio sumario procedures, especially because, in its
view, any court trying the juntas as "mediate authors" (autores
mediatos) would have to first decide two threshold questions: (1)
the guilt of those subordinates immediately responsible for the al-
leged crimes; and (2) the extent to which illicit acts by the disap-
peared victims justified the acts perpetrated against them.5 7 In
other words, the Consejo envisioned two massive trials: one trial of
the victims, lower-level officers and soldiers and a subsequent trial
of the superiors. Such a series of trials would raise the danger of
statutes of limitations running out. More importantly, the question
of whether "the disappeared" committed crimes for which they
could have been prosecuted under Argentina's criminal laws was
irrelevant to prosecuting defendants accused of by-passing those
laws. Finally, while it is true that the trials of superiors and subor-
dinates involved many of the same facts, there is no theoretical
reason to consolidate them into the same proceeding, and many
practical reasons not to do so. Indeed, to the extent that courts
trying subordinates recognize the defense of superior orders,"
there are good reasons to try superiors first.
In early October, the CAmara Federal took jurisdiction of the
case, sent for the Consejo's dossier, and announced that it would
try the case de novo." Because the case began in the military jus-
tice system, the Cimara announced that it would continue to apply
the procedural and substantive law of the C6digo de Justicia
Militar, including that of the juicio sumario.6 Several of the de-
fendants appealed the constitutionality of the law granting the
C6mara jurisdiction to the Argentine Supreme Court. 1 The Su-
preme Court rejected the appeal, upholding the power of the Presi-
55. Cuestionb las denuncias contra las ex juntas el Consejo Supremo, Clarin, Sept. 26,
1984, at 2.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 3. This news story contains an extensive excerpt from the Consejo's report.
58. See infra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
59. Appeals Court to Handle Junta Trials, Buenos Aires Herald, Oct. 5, 1984.
60. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,290-97.
61. Judgment of Dec. 27, 1984, Corte Suprema de Justicia de Ia Naci6n [hereinafter
C.J.N.], 1985-I Jurisprudencia Argentina [hereinafter J.A.] 675 (Causa originariamente in-
struida por el Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas en cumplimiento del decreto 158/83
del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional [Jorge Rafael Videla case]).
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dent, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, to regulate the
trial of military offenses."
B. The Trial
Trial before the C~mara began in February, 1985, with a flurry
of preliminary motions and opening statements by the prosecution
and defendants.03 On April 22, public interest rose to its highest
pitch when the prosecution produced its evidence in open hear-
ings.4 Despite intensive journalistic coverage and periodic demon-
strations in adjoining streets, the Chmara enforced strict rules of
court decorum to prevent the trial from degenerating into a
circus.6 5
The prosecution chose to present the most representative 700
cases.66 The majority of the witnesses offered were victims; how-
ever, ex-Presidents Isabelita de Per6n and Alejandro Lanusse,
United States diplomat Patricia Derain, Peronist minister Italo
Luder, and subordinate officers also testified. 7 Some of the wit-
nesses established links between high-level officers and specific
anti-subversive operations, but most testified to the widespread,
serious, and institutionalized nature of the violations. In mid-Au-
gust, the parade of prosecution witnesses ended. 8 Prosecution ar-
guments took up the first half of September. 9 The defendants
presented their cases during October. Without attempting to deny
the factual picture of the dirty war presented by the prosecution,
the defendants' lawyers questioned the legal significance of those
62. Id.; Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,289-90.
63. Agosti declarb ante la Cdmara Federal, Clarin, Feb. 26, 1985, at 6, col. 1.
64. Confirm6 la Cdmara que el 22 se inicia el juicio a los ex comandantes, Clarin, Apr.
13, 1985, at 12, col. 1.
65. Como serdn juzgados los ex comandantes, Clarin, Mar. 3, 1985, at 14, col. 1; La
cdmara respondib a versiones que tergiversan el juicio a las ex juntas, Clarin, Apr. 9, 1985,
at 5, Col. 1.
66. Fiscal y defensores ofrecieron mas de 2.200 testigos, La Raz6n, Apr. 18, 1985, at 24,
col. 2; El juicia a los ex comandantes, La Naci6n, Apr. 18, 1985, at 1.
67. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6; Former Pilar Police Chief Questioned, Buenos
Aires Herald, May 16, 1985; Lanusse Says Videla Must Have Known, Buenos Aires Herald,
May 14, 1985; Harguindeguy: Most Backed Repression, Buenos Aires Herald, May 15, 1985
(testimony of a former Interior Minister); Lieutenant Lambasts Army Brass, Buenos Aires
Herald, June 20, 1985; Admitib un comodoro operativos secretos, Clarin, Aug. 7, 1985, at 16,
col. 1.
68. Probamos todos los cargos a las ex juntas, Clarin, Aug. 16, 1985.
69. Falsedad documental: Argumentos del Fiscal, Clarin, Aug. 18, 1985, at 12, col. 1;
Junta Chiefs hear Strassera Summary, Buenos Aires Herald, Sept. 12, 1985; Life Sentences
Sought For Five, Buenos Aires Herald, Sept. 19, 1985.
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facts. Their chief argument was that the state of internal war in
which the country found itself necessitated and justified a suspen-
sion of all constitutional guarantees. 0 In addition, some defense
counsel argued that their clients were merely obeying orders of the
previous government;"1 that many prosecution witnesses were un-
reliable because they were involved in leftist subversion;7 that the
defense had been given insufficient time to present its case;"3 that
the prosecution's theory of responsibility was incorrect;" that the
defense was not given enough chance to cross-examine witnesses;7"
and that the court was biased in favor of the prosecution in what
amounted to a trial of the victors by the vanquished.
7
1
The Cdmara recessed to prepare its opinion, which it an-
nounced to an open packed court on December 9, 1985.77 Videla
and Massera were sentenced to prison for life; Agosti, Viola, and
Lambruschini were sentenced to prison for four and a half, seven-
teen, and eight years, respectively; Graffigna, Galtieri, Anaya, and
Lami Dozo went free." The verdicts and sentences reflected the
CAmara's refusal to allocate guilt collectively, by juntas, as the
prosecution requested. Hence, the commanders of the Army, which
had played a much greater role in the dirty war than had the Navy
or Air Force, received longer sentences.
79
70. Tavares: State of Revolutionary War Justified Military Actions, Buenos Aires
Herald, Oct. 1, 1985; Excesses Were Justified, Says Massera Defense, Buenos Aires Herald,
Oct. 3, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Viola defense says: 'Juntas Trial Helps Extremist Groups', Buenos
Aires Herald, Oct. 11, 1985. The Ctenara rejected this argument in the Junta Opinion, supra
note 1, at 29,747-84.
71. Tavares: State of Revolutionary War Justified Military Actions, Buenos Aires
Herald, Oct. 1, 1985; Tavares Asks for Videla's Acquittal, Buenos Aires Herald, Oct. 2,
1985, at 1, col. 1; Lami Dozo: Argentine Society Should Be On Trial, Buenos Aires Herald,
Oct. 22, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
72. Tavares Asks For Videla's Acquittal, Buenos Aires Herald, Oct. 2, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
73. Id.
74. Pidieron la absoluci6n del ex titular de la Armada, Clarin, Oct. 4, 1985, at 4, col. 1;
Lambruschini: 'My Honour Is Intact', Buenos Aires Herald, Oct. 16, 1985; Galtieri: 'Let
God And History Be My Judges', Buenos Aires Herald, Oct. 18, 1985, at 1.
75. Viola's Lawyers Say Court Biased, Buenos Aires Herald, Oct. 12, 1985, at 1.
76. Id.; Viola Defence Says: 'Juntas Trial Helps Extremist Groups', Buenos Aires Her-
ald, Oct. 11, 1985; Videla: Los derrotados se han tornado revancha, Clarin, Oct. 26, 1985.
77. See supra note 1.
78. Penas pedidas y condenas, La Naci6n, Dec. 10, 1985; Junta Opinion, supra note 1,
at 29,833-38.




As is the practice in civil law systems, the Citmara acted both
as judge and as trier of fact. Hence, the opinion, which in type-
script fills thousands of pages, contained a summary of the facts
found in each of the 700 cases put forward by the prosecution, as
well as arguments on points of law.
1. Preliminary Questions
The court began by reaffirming the Argentine Supreme
Court's ruling that upheld the presidential decree and the statute
granting the CAmara jurisdiction over the case and repealing the
junta's own amnesty law.8" The CAmara rejected the argument that
the juicio sumario procedure mandated by these laws denied the
accused an opportunity to defend themselves, claiming that the de-
fendants had not described what use they would have made of a
longer period."1
The Cimara then narrated the historical context of the dirty
war, summarizing the widespread violence from both left and right
as well as the state of seige and other adjustments made in the
legal regime to deal with the situation. 2 It described the common
modus operandi of the disappearances and the elaborate secret
support structure of zones of control and detention centers.83 It
pointed to the defendants' failure to investigate, and active frus-




Next, the court handled the prosecution's contention that re-
sponsibility for all of the crimes which occurred during the tenure
of each junta should be assigned to all three members on a collec-
tive basis.85 Such an attribution would have enabled the prosecu-
80. Id. at 28,285-92, referring to the Videla case, 1985- I.J.A. 675. Since this paper does
not aim to be, nor is this author qualified to carry out, an analysis of Argentine constitu-
tional or general criminal law, the issues will only be pointed out, not discussed.
81. Id. at 28,293-97.
82. Id. at 28,306-49.
83. Id. at 28,349-471.
84. Id. at 28,472-93.
85. Id. at 28,493-510.
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tion to obtain sentences for the heads of the Navy and Air Force
equal to those given the Army heads, despite the fact that the for-
mer services contributed less to the dirty war. The Cimara re-
jected this allocation of responsibility. It found that effective con-
trol over anti-subversive operations had only been proven up
through the chain of command of each force."' Laws and state-
ments made at the time extolling the junta's unity were dismissed
as political declarations.8
7
3. Evidence Linking the Junta with Subordinates' Actions
The court opinion made it clear that the junta members were
being tried for the affirmative acts of ordering and otherwise facili-
tating the crimes charged, not for mere negligence or failure to pre-
vent them. The court pointed to the organized and uniform meth-
ods used in the kidnappings.8 It observed that subordinates could
not have carried out such widespread operations without logistic
support, cooperation from civilian authorities, and, most impor-
tantly, assurance of impunity.8" In fact, the defendants had repeat-
edly asserted that they were in complete command of their subor-
dinates throughout the entire period.90 Conversely, the few
subordinates who took the stand declared that all of their actions
were authorized from above.91 The Cfimara cited specific testimony
where subordinates stated that orders for anti-subversive opera-
tions were always given orally, so as to preserve secrecy.2 There
was proof that, instead of acting on reports of violations, the junta
had actively frustrated investigations, sent false responses to judi-
cial inquiries, and established procedures to insure that operations
would remain clandestine.98 In its public announcements, the junta
had frequently referred to the waging of a dirty war and to the
necessity of using unusual procedures." When the junta an-
nounced that it had won the war towards the end of 1979, the
number of disappearances dropped precipitously. 9 In sum, the
86. Id. at 28,493-96.
87. Id. at 28,495-97.
88. Id. at 28,497.
89. Id. at 28,498, 28,502-03.
90. Id. at 28,501.
91. Id. at 28,502.
92. Id. at 28,505-07.
93. Id. at 28,505-10.
94. Id. at 28,503-04.
95. Id. at 28,500-01.
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court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that the
defendants had expressly ordered the operation of a system
designed to commit crimes.
The Ciumara also rejected defense attempts to impugn the tes-
timony of victims and their families introduced by the prosecution.
It found that the C6digo de Justicia Militar allows "any person
with knowledge of the facts" to serve as a witness, entrusting the
judge with the responsibility of weighing credibility.' The defense
argued that the victims were tainted with subversion and could not
accurately testify to events taking place years before. The Cmunara,
however, noted that the lack of more objective witnesses resulted
from the methods of operation chosen by the defendants;97 that
most witnesses' testimony at trial coincided with their declarations
at the time of the events and with the testimony of other prisoners
held at the same detention centers;98 and that the defense had
been given ample opportunity to cross-examine each of the
witnesses."9
Hundreds of pages containing findings of fact in 700 cases fol-
lowed. 100 The court classified the facts under the rubrics of illegal
deprivation of liberty, torture, torture resulting in death, homicide,
and robbery.101 The court rejected the prosecution's charges of
cover-ups, involuntary servitude, falsification of public documents,
extortion, and usurpation of real property, holding either that the
prosecution failed to meet the statutory definitions of the particu-
lar crimes or that the prosecution did not establish that these acts
were consequences of the system set up by the accused rather than
excesses committed by subordinates.
10 2
4. Affirmative Defenses
The next two sections, dealing with justifications argued by
the defense and the theory of responsibility, form the heart of the
96. C6D. Jus. MiL. arts. 253-54; Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,517.
97. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 28,522-23.
98. Id. at 28,525-28.
99. Id. at 28,528.
100. Id. at 28,599-731.
101. Id. at 29,731-36. The crimes listed are codified, with specified aggravating circum-
stances, in C6D[GO PENAL [hereinafter C6D. PENAL] arts. 144 bis, 144 ter., 80, 164 (F.
Zamora, ed. 1982). The Cumnara threw out the homicide and torture-death charges that were
not backed up by a corpus delicti, although there was evidence to the effect that the mili-
tary systematically destroyed bodies. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 29,734-35.
102. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 29,737-40.
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opinion. Considerando Sexto discusses causas de justificaci6n or
affirmative defenses.108 The defendants claimed three such de-
fenses: (1) necessity; (2) obedience to the law; and (3) self defense
or defense of others.'" The Argentine C6digo Penal grants a de-
fense of necessity to "one who causes an evil in order to avoid an
imminent, greater evil for which he is not responsible."' 9 Legal
scholars interpret this defense to require that the accused have no
other reasonable means to avoid the greater evil, and that the evils
and means adopted be judged from the point of view of the ac-
cused at the time he made his choice. 08
The Cnara found that the junta had acted to prevent terror-
ist acts and the violent overthrow of the government.107 The court
conceded that the defendants were not responsible for creating
these dangers. However, it found that the danger of a successful
revolution was not an imminent danger, 108 nor was the terrorism
perpetuated by the state a lesser evil than that by leftists: "[I]f
kidnapping and killing was aimed at preventing kidnappings and
killings, then the defendants were not producing a 'lesser evil' to
avoid a 'greater evil'. . . the evils would be equivalent."' Most
importantly, the Chmara found that the junta enjoyed ample legal
powers to combat terrorism. Beginning in 1973, a series of statutes
and decrees gave certain powers to the military police. These en-
actments put large sections of the country under military govern-
ment, extended military jurisdiction, proclaimed a state of seige,
and empowered the military authorities to legislate in areas under
their control." 0 The junta, however, exceeded its powers by violat-
ing constitutional rights that had not been suspended, including
the right to a trial, the prohibition on torture, and the abolition of
the death penalty for political offenses."' The court found that the
defendants could have defeated subversion by using the legal
103. Id. at 29,741-84.
104. Article 510 of C6i. Jus. MIL. incorporates the first book of the C6digo Penal by
reference. Affirmative defenses are found at C6D. PEN. art. 34, incisos 30, 40, 50, 60, 70.
105. "No son punibles ...el que causare un mal por evitar otro mayor inminente a
que ha sido extrafho...," C6D. PEN. art. 34, inciso 30.
106. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 29,747-48.
107. Id. at 29,748-49.
108. Id.
109. "[S]i se secuestraba y mataba para evitar que se siguiera matando y secuestrando,
no se estaria produciendo un 'mel menor' para evitar un 'meal mayor'.., los males habrian
sido equivalentes. ... Id.
110. Id. at 29,740-48.
111. Id. at 29,746.
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means that they had at their disposal.' 2
Several defendants argued that they had only acted in re-
sponse to orders of the civilian government. Specifically, they cited
a decree of the Peronist government declaring that "the Armed
Forces ... will proceed to carry out whatever military and secur-
ity operations are necessary to destroy the activity of subversive
elements in the entire national territory."' 3 The Cfimara pointed
out the irony of the military junta claiming to have acted under
orders of the very government that it had overthrown." " The court
then observed that the Peronist executive had no power to abro-
gate the Constitution and that witnesses from that government
had testified that the decree ordered the destruction of the subver-
sives' fighting ability, and not the massacre of subversives."'
Third, the court considered the defendants' claims of self de-
fense and defense of others. It found the leftist terrorists engaged
in illegitimate and unprovoked aggression, satisfying two require-
ments of the defense.' However, the defendants failed to show a
rational necessity for the means they chose to combat this aggres-
sion. Again, legitimate means would have sufficed.""
Finally, the Cdmara considered broader, nonstatutory de-
fenses."' The most sweeping of these was the contention that the
junta confronted a state of internal war, and that in such a war
112. Id. at 29,750.
113. "[Llas Fuerzas Armadas . . procederhn a ejecutar las operaciones militares y de
seguridad que sean necesarias a efectos de aniquilar el accionar de los elementos subver-
sivos en todo el territorio del pals." Decree 2772, quoted in id. at 29,752-53 (emphasis
added).
114. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, 29,753.
115. Id. at 29,753-55.
116. Id. at 29,755, referring to C6D. PEN. art. 34, incisos 60, 70.
117. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 29,755-58.
118. Id. at 29,758-84. The C mara discussed the doctrine of antijuricidad material, ac-
cording to which an act may be criminal and fall outside statutory justifications, yet be
excused because it conforms to a society's true values. The court rejected this argument,
pointing to the military's efforts to keep the disappearances secret as evidence that they
were unacceptable to most Argentines. Id. at 29,758-61. The court also rejected an argument
that the junta's actions deserved a lessened punishment under C6D. PEN. art. 35, supra note
101, as excesses committed in the course of carrying out justified actions under extreme
circumstances. The court found that the disappearances, torture, and executions were illegal
ab initio. Moreover, Article 35 is intended to lessen the punishment of individuals who over-
react to danger or other stress. The accused, by contrast, were high government officials
sitting removed from the battle: "(N]o es admisible que un gobierno que concentraba en sus
manos toda la fuerza del Derecho y de las armas obrara como lo hi2o, sobre la base de una
perturbacion del Animo de sus miembros." Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 29,763.
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rules do not apply (inter armas jura silent).119 The court accepted
the defendants' labelling of the situation as a state of war.'20 How-
ever, the judges refused to concede that the rule of law had been
suspended; they cited Article 23 of the Argentine Constitution
which limits military power even during a state of seige,'2 ' powers
reserved to the Congress in regard to war,122 and rules of conduct
during war contained in the C6digo Penal and the C6digo de Jus-
ticia Militar.'2 3 The court also briefly discussed a long series of in-
ternational treaties, signed by Argentina, recognizing limits on the
conduct of war and treatment of prisoners.12 4 Finally, the court ob-
served that the defendants' arguments amounted to the assertion
that some elements of a government are beyond its own laws and
that the ends justify any means. The judges declared such a view
impermissible in any society claiming to have a legal system. 12
5. Command Responsibility
The C~mara's affirmation of the applicability of law to inter-
nal unrest was probably its most important statement to the Ar-
gentine public. It confronts a widely held belief in Latin America
that orderly legal procedures and restraints on government power
are luxuries dispensable in times of national stress. The extreme
right and extreme left of Argentina often agree in this belief.1
2
1
The most interesting legal issues arise in Considerando Sep-
timo which deals with the responsibility of the junta commanders-
in-chief for crimes committed by their subordinates. The issues are
important not only because the defendants could not be con-
demned unless they were held responsible in some way for the
crimes, but also because the Argentine C6digo Penal recognizes di-
minished roles, such as "accomplice" and "instigator," and assigns
lesser punishments to them than to "principals" or "autores.'
12
7
119. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 29,766.
120. Id. at 29,764-65.
121. Id. at 29,768-70; CONSTITUCI6N DE LA NACI6N art. 23.
122. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 29,770-71; CONsTrrUCO6N DE LA NACI6N arts.
67(15), (21), (23)-(29), 23.
123. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 29,771-74.
124. Id. at 29,774-84.
125. Id. at 29,766, 29,780-84.
126. On the philosophy of the violent left, see, e.g., id. at 28,306-27. For that of the
right, see id. at 29,765-66; NUNCA MAs, supra note 3, at 473-76.
127. C6D. PEN. arts. 45-49, is made applicable to this case by C6D. Jus. MiL. art. 513.
Participaci6n criminal or autoara has been discussed by many Spanish and Argentine legal
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Defense counsel argued that, under Argentine law, only those who
commit the crime can be considered its authors; that there can be
no imputation of guilt when these authors are independent human
beings responsible for their own acts, and that, even if the junta
members were guilty as instigators, they must be tried together
with the executors of the crimes.
12
8
First, the Cinara reviewed the three principal theories ad-
,vanced by Roman-Civil Law legal writers to explain "criminal au-
thorship." The court quickly rejected the subjective theory, which
finds all those who participate in a crime with an animus autoris,
or intention to be perpetrators, should be punished as such; those
with an animus socii should be punished only as accomplices.12
The "formal-objective theory," proposed by the defense, denies au-
thorship to those who do not commit at least some of the elements
of the crime.' The mediate author (autor mediato) theory holds
that those who exercise the dominio del hecho or control over the
commission of a crime are its authors.'
The court then analyzed article 514 of the C6digo de Justicia
Militar and articles 34 and 45 of the C6digo Penal to determine
which theory best explained the language of the statutes. Article
514, source of the famous "due obedience" (obediencia debida)
doctrine, reads:
When a crime has been committed by executing a military or-
der, the superior who gave it shall be held solely responsible,
and the subordinate shall be considered an accomplice only
when he has committed excesses in carrying out the said
order.""
theorists. See, e.g., E. BACIGALUPO, LA NOCI6N DEL AUTOR EN EL C6DIGO PENAL (1965); L.
JIM19NEZ DE ASOA, LA LEY Y EL DELITO: PRINCIPIOS DE DERECHO PENAL, at 495-509 (1980).
128. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 29,786.
129. Id. at 29,787.
130. Id. at 29,786-88 Jim6nez de As6a offers a more
sophisticated version of this theory than the one caricatured by the Cdmara. According to
his version, one who forces another, by duress or deception, to execute a crime, has actually
committed the elements of the crime because the executor is a mere instrument. The execu-
tor bears no criminal responsibility at all, because he can allege one of the affirmative de-
fenses, such as incapacity (inimputabilidad), duress, obedience to orders (obediencia
debida), or error. If the executor is also criminally responsible, then the situation is one of
codelincuencia, and the perpetrators must be divided into authors and accomplices. L.
JIMtNFz DE ASA, supra note 127, at 501-02. These distinctions are necessary because Span-
ish criminal law and Latin American codes generally do not recognize the crime of conspir-
acy except as a type of attempt. Id. at 466.
131. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 29,788; E. BACIGALUPO, supra note 127, at 49-55.
132. "Cuando se haya cometido delito par la ejecuci6n de una orden del servicio, el
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Conversely, the military code makes it a crime to refuse to carry
out the orders of a superior, with no exception for illegal orders. 3
On the civilian side, article 34 absolves one who "acts in accor-
dance with due obedience. 118 4 The article on civilian responsibility
provides:
Those who take part in the execution of a crime or lend the au-
thor or authors aid or cooperation without which it could not
have been committed, will suffer the punishment established for
that crime. The same punishment will fall on those who directly
cause another to commit the crime." 5
The Ci.mara found the language of these statutes more com-
patible with a theory that makes responsibility depend on causa-
tion and control as opposed to one that hinges on the commission
of certain enumerated acts." 6 It observed that, if guilt depends on
execution but a military executor can defend on the basis of due
obedience, then many military crimes would have no perpetrator at
all. " ' The control theory, the court maintained, is the one most
compatible with the strict discipline of military institutions; 38 the
sister codes of Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, Chile, and Colombia, as
well as their venerable ancestors, Roman law and the Fuero Juzgo,
contained similar provisions.""9
The defense, however, argued that the existence of indepen-
dent actors further down the chain of command negated control of
the crime.14 0 Among other things, acceptance of this theory would
force the court to choose between condemning the commanders or
their subordinates. The Citmara countered with a concept it la-
belled "the organized apparatus of power" (el aparato organizado
de poder)." According to this concept, the accused commanders
didn't use any one subordinate or group of subordinates, but used
superior que la hubiere dado serfi el (inico responsable, y solo serA considerado c6mplice el
inferior, cuando 6ste se hubiere excedido en el cumplimiento de dicha orden." C6D. Jus. Mn.
133. Id. arts. 667, 674, 675.
134. COD. PEN. art. 34, inciso 50.
135. "Los que tomasen parte en la ejecuci~n del hecho o prestasen al autor o autores un
auxilio o cooperacibn sin los cuales no habria podido cometerse, tendrhn la pena establecida
para el delito. En la misma pena incurrirfin los
que hubiesen determinado directamente a otro a cometerlo." Id. art. 45.
136. Junta Opinion, supra note 1, at 29,788-90.
137. Id. at 29,796.
138. Id. at 29,789.
139. Id. at 29,791-93.
140. Id. at 29,786.
141. Id. at 29,795, 29,798-800.
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the entire apparatus of the state as an instrument to exercise com-
plete control. Even if an individual subordinate possessed and ex-
ercised the power to refuse to obey illegal orders, the accused could
always have replaced that subordinate. If the second subordinate
refused, he could be replaced with a third, and so on. As long as
the defendants controlled the state and the armed forces, the fun-
gibility of these instruments assured that the junta's illegal orders
would be carried out.'4 2 Hence, the independent will of the defend-
ants' human instruments does not negate the dorninio del hecho.
Moreover, proof of any particular subordinate's guilt is not a logi-
cal prerequisite for proof of the guilt of the defendants. Lastly, a
verdict against the commanders does not preclude a verdict against
some of their subordinates. This is because the organized appara-
tus theory does not presuppose lack of legal responsibility in sub-
ordinates. In terms of the Codes, "there exist subordinates who
will not be covered by the excuse of due obedience."'' 3 Thus, the
Chmara opened the way for human rights trials of other officers.
6. The Verdict
Having established these legal principles, the court applied
them to the facts. It found that, because of the affirmative acts of
ordering the use of illegal methods, assuring impunity, providing
logistic support, and actively frustrating judicial and other efforts
to save the victims, the accused were responsible for the crimes
committed by their subordinates during the dirty war. In addition,
they were found guilty of certain inevitable consequences resulting
from the methods chosen by them such as the pillaging of house-
holds of those disappeared. 4" The C~mara proceeded to attribute
the crimes it considered proven among the defendants according to
whether each crime was committed by subordinates of that defend-
ant during his tenure as commander-in-chief.1' The sentencing of
these defendants followed. 46
142. Of course, if enough subordinates refused to carry out the illegal orders, those or-
ders would not be put into effect. But organized disobedience would also negate the junta's
control of the "organized apparatus of power." The defendants testified at trial that they
were in control of their subordinates See id. at 28,501.
143. Id. at 29,796.
144. Id. at 29,793-800. However, the Cimara found that
the kidnapping of children and rapes included in the prosecution's charges were not ordered
by the defendants nor were they foreseeable consequences of their orders.
145. Id. at 29,804-31.
146. Id. at 29,833-50.
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D. Subsequent Developments
Under the Argentine judicial system, the prosecution and the
defense may appeal decisions of the Chmara to the Corte Suprema
if they allege an error in interpretation of the constitution or na-
tional laws."" The condemned defendants appealed the CAmara's
interpretation of obediencia debida and its refusal to apply the
"auto-amnesty" law. 1 8 The prosecution appealed the C~mara's
failure to allocate responsibility to each junta as a whole. The pros-
ecution also appealed the rejection of the cover-up and falsification
of documents charges and some of the findings in particular
cases. 
1 4
On December 30, 1986, the five-member Argentine Supreme
Court handed down its decision: a unanimous affirmance. All five
members of the Court rejected the defenses's attacks on Law
23,040, giving the CAmara jurisdiction; the Court also rejected the
prosecution's theory of collective responsibility.' 5 Three justices,
Jose Severo Caballero (the Chief Justice), Augusto Cesar Belluscio,
and Carlos Santiago Fayt, voted to reduce Viola's sentence by six
months and Agosti's by nine months. 5" Caballero and Belluscio
also took issue with the Clumara's theory of responsibility. Appar-
ently espousing the "formal objective" theory, they argued that the
junta members could be at most instigators, since they did not
commit the objective acts defining each crime. 52 Justices Enrique
Petracchi and Jorge Bacqu6 accepted the CAmara's responsibility
analysis, including its control theory and the concept of the "or-
ganized power apparatus" as an instrument of the crime.15 Justice
Fayt apparently agreed with part of Petracchi and Bacqu6's re-
147. Law 48, art. 14, Sept. 14, 1863, reprinted in C6DIGo DE PROCEDIMIENrOS EN LO
CRIMINAL PARA LA JUSTICIA FEDERAL 146 (I. Dova de Zavalia, ed. 1981).
148. Va a la Corte el juicio a los ex comandantes, La Naci6n, Mar. 10, 1986; Recursos
de queja por el fallo a los ex comandantes, Clarin, Mar. 18, 1986; El juicio a los ex co-
mandantes: Lo que tratard la Corte, Clarin, Mar. 9, 1986; Supreme Court Reviews Junta
Trial, Buenos Aires Herald, Mar. 19, 1986, at 9.
149. See news stories cited supra note 148; Apelacidn (sintesis), in N. MONTENGRO,
supra note 15, at 245-49.
150. Confirmanse las condenas a los ex comandantes, La Naci6n, Jan. 5, 1987, at 5,
Col. 1.
151. Id. The Court found that Viola had been sentenced for two crimes not listed in the
indictment, while Agosti had been sentenced for three crimes barred by the statute of limi-
tations. Id. The remaining two justices argued that Viola and Agosti's remaining crimes





sponsibility analysis. He accepted the Cimara's characterization of
the defendants as "authors," but would have held that subordi-
nates could not be prosecuted for the same crimes. 1 4 In short, the
Supreme Court affirmed the result of the junta trial and left its
analysis of responsibility undisturbed.
Meanwhile, related trials proceeded. Mario Firmenich, a
Mononero guerrilla leader extradited from Brazil, was, as of this
writing, being tried for several kidnappings and attacks carried out
by his group.'" Like the junta members, Firmenich has not denied
that his group carried out the actions, but claims that his subordi-
nates acted independently. 1 "
Trials of military officers also continued. In mid-May of 1986,
the Armed Forces Consejo Supremo sentenced Anaya, Galtieri, and
Lami Dozo to prison terms for negligence in fighting the Malvinas
War.'07 On December 3, 1983, the CAmara Federal handed down
substantial sentences against General Ram6n Camps and other top
military and police officials in charge of the Buenos Aires area dur-
ing the dirty war.158 The civilian courts also moved quickly to take
over cases in which the military appeared to be dragging its feet. 
15
L6pez Rega, Isabelita's right-hand man, was extradited from the
United States.' This multiplication of indictments caused unrest
154. Id. Fayt would have allowed prosecution of only those subordinates who commit-
ted excesses. Id.
155. The trial was authorized by Decree 157/83, Dec. 15, 1983, 1983-B A.D.L.A. 1941,
supra note 54, promulgated by President Alfonsin on the same day as the decree authoriz-
ing trial of the junta. Graves acusaciones contra el jefe de los montoneros, La Naci6n, Apr.
14, 1986, at 5, col. 1 (hereinafter Graves acusaciones]; Denegaron to excarcelaci6n de
Firmenich, La Naci6n, Oct. 6, 1986, at 1, col 1; Piden reclusi6n perpetua, La Naci6n, Oct.
6, 1986, at 4, col. 4.
156. Graves acusaciones, supra note 155.
157. Anaya received 14 years, Galtieri received 12 years, and Lami Dozo received 8
years. Guerra de las Malvinas; Notificaron las condenas, La Naci6n, May 19, 1986, at 1, col.
1; Informe del Consejo al Ministerio de Defensa, La Naci6n, May 19, 1986, at 5, col. 1;
Falklands Verdicts, Latin Am. Monitor, Apr. 1986, at 282, col. 1; Argentina: Falklands
Trial, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., May 23, 1986, at 4, col. 2.
158. Camps received 25 years imprisonment, and 4 of his subordinates received from 4
to 23 years. Condenaron a Camps a 25 ahtos de reclusi6n, La Naci6n, Dec. 8, 1986, at 1, col.
3; 5 Convictions in Argentina, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1986, § IV, at 2, col. 1. Two lower-level
officers were acquitted. Id. A police doctor, Jorge Berg6s, received six years for helping out
in the torture chambers. Id.
159. Una decisi6n judicial y las relaciones con las FF.AA., La Naci6n, June 23, 1986,
at 5, col. 1; C6rdoba: revocan resoluciones del Consejo Supremo, La Naci6n, Nov. 24, 1986,
at 1, col. 5 (a federal court in the city of C6rdoba voided a military court's decision that the
cases against Gen. Luciano Benjamin Men6ndez and others were barred by the statute of
limitations).
160. Trajeron a L6pez Rega; estd alojado en a U-22, La Naci6n, July 7, 1986, at 1, col.
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in the barracks, which increased when an active-duty officer re-
ceived a subpoena to testify in federal court.161 Fearing that he was
losing control of the trials and that the military would intervene to
protect its own, President Alfonsin issued a directive to prosecu-
tors ordering the speed-up of trials and establishing a broad defini-
tion of "due obedience."' 2
Alfonsin also pushed through Congress a so-called punto final
or full stop law.1 63 The punto final law extinguishes all criminal
prosecutions brought under Law 23,049 (the law that gave civilian
courts jurisdiction over these cases) later than sixty days after the
passage of the punto final. "6' An amendment added by the Senate
brought leftist civilian participants in the dirty war under the
same protection. 68 The law allows the federal courts to order cases
before the military courts transferred to the federal courts.'" How-
ever, it allows the superior officer of any accused soldier to request
that the accused await trial in the barracks, carrying out his regu-
lar duties, instead of under preventive detention." 7 Any time dur-
ing which the accused was a fugitive, the case was in the process of
being transferred, or the court was hearing motions, is excluded
from the sixty-day period.'" The law does not affect civil suits." 9
Street demonstrators, often violent, protested the punto final
law, but Congress passed it by a large margin.170 In the next weeks,
1; Procesan a Lbpez Rega en la causa par la Triple A, La Naci6n, July 14, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
161. The witness was Lt. Col. Carlos Pla, who had been chief of police in the town of
San Luis during the dirty war. Serbn analizados los juicios a los militares, La Naci6n, Sept.
15, 1986, at 5, col. 5. For reports on the rise in tensions, see Christian, Argentina Agonizes
Over "Dirty War" Trials, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1986, § E, at 3, col. 1; Elan, Letter from
Argentina, New Yorker, July 21, 1986, at 74.
162. El gobierno fij6 los l1mites de la obediencia debida, La Naci6n, Apr. 28, 1986, at 1,
col. 1; Alternative Found To Military Amnesty: Most Officers Benefit From Obediencia
Debida, Latin Am. Regional Rep.: Southern Cone, May 23, 1986, at 2, col. 3; Military Trials:
Some Cases to be Dismissed, Latin Am. Monitor, May, 1986, at 293, col. 1. One of the
judges who presided at the junta trial resigned upon hearing of this directive. Zibell, El juez
que dijo no, LA SEMANA, May 7, 1986, at 58; Appeals judge Torlasco quits, Buenos Aires
Herald, May 4, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
163. La Cdmara de Diputados convirti6 en ley el proyecto de punto final, La Naci6n,
Dec. 29, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Christian, Argentina and Uruguay Pardon Some Old Abuses,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1986, § 4, at 3, col. 1.
164. Law 23, 492, art. 1, Dec. 23, 1986, 1987-1 Boletin Informativo A.D.L.A. 1; see El
texto de la ley, La Naci6n, Dec. 29, 1987, at 8, col. 5 (full Spanish text).
165. El Presidente atacb los extremismos, La Naci6n, Dec. 22, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
166. Law 23,492, arL 2, 1987-1 Boletin Informativo A.D.L.A. 1.
167. Id. art. 3; C6O. Jus. Mn. arts. 309-318.
168. Id. arts. 1, 4.
169. Id. art. 6.
170. Incidente con Madres de Plaza de Mayo, La Naci6n, Dec. 29, 1986, at 5, col. 1;
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the federal courts responded to the law with a flurry of transfer
orders and indictments, attempting to beat the deadline. 71 Some
of these trials will raise the difficult issues of superior-subordinate
responsibility discussed elsewhere in this article. In April 1987,
army units in C6rdoba, Buenos Aires, Salta and Tucumfn muti-
nied. 17' Alfonsin succeeded in quelling these rebellions. However,
the civilian government was forced to make concessions: Alfonsin
asked the Army Chief of Staff to resign, and he persuaded the Ar-
gentine Supreme Court to take over a test case in order to resolve
the question of due obedience. 17 Until the test case is resolved by
the Supreme Court, other dirty war prosecutions remain in
limbo. 1 7  While human rights organizations have denounced the re-
cent turn of events, Argentines not involved in the cases have ex-
pressed a sense that the punto final law and the affirmation of the
junta verdict will remove the dirty war from the front pages and
allow the country to forget.1
7
5
Protesta de ex detenidos frente al Parlamento, La Naci6n, Dec. 29, 1986, at 5, col. 5; La
Climara de Diputados convierti6 en ley el proyecto de punto final, La Naci6n, Dec. 29,
1986, at 1, col. 1.
171. Argentina! Military Trials, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Jan. 22, 1986, at 12, col. 1;
Fue detenido Carlos Sudrez Mason, La Naci6n, Jan. 26, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (ex-general, fugi-
tive from corruption and dirty war charges, arrested in the United States); Opinibn con-
traria a un fallo de La justicia federal, La Naci6n, Jan. 26, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (the military
Consejo Supremo absolved 15 admirals for murder and torture of detainees at the Naval
Mechanics School; the federal courts prepared to take over the case); El fiscal de Bahia
Blanca afirm6 que no aceptard presiones del Gobierno, La Naci6n, Jan. 26, 1987, at 8, col. 1
(a federal prosecutor declared that, as an officer of the judicial rather than the executive
branch, he is not bound by the Alfonsin government's directives on dirty war trials); Crespo,
Comenzb el juicio por las extradicibn de Su6rez Mason, La Nacibn, Feb. 2, 1987, at 1, col. 5
(extradition of Subrez Mason); Argentina: Trials of officers set to continue, Latin Am.
Weekly Rep., Feb. 5, 1987, at 9, col. 1.
172. Christian, Argentine Chief Resists Demands of Officers Rebellious Over Arrest,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1987 at 1, col. 5; Riding, Argentina Delays Move on Mutinous Troops,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1987, sec. I at 9, col. 1; Riding, Army Commander in Argentina Quits
in Wake of Revolt, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1987, at 1, col. 3; Christian, 2 Winners in Argen-
tina: Alfonsin and Democracy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1987, at 4, col. 1; Christian, Rumblings
Persist in Argentine Army, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Christian, Argentina
Considering Steps to Appease the Military, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1987, at 3, col. 3; Chris-
tian, Argentine Generals Reported Helpless in Revolts, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1987, at 5, col.
1.
173. See sources cited supra note 172, especially Christian, Argentina Considering
Steps to Appease the Military.
174. Christian, Argentina Considering Steps to Appease the Military, supra note 172.
175. Punto final: duro ataque de Alfonsin a los extremismos, La Naci6n, Dec. 22, 1986,
at 5, col. 1.
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IV. A BRIEF COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF RESPONSIBILITY IN
MILITARY HIERARCHIES
The central legal problem arising from the junta trial is the
allocation of responsibility for criminal acts committed by an insti-
tution with a hierarchical structure. The problem raises two issues:
the extent to which responsibility flows upward from subordinates
to superiors; and the extent to which superior responsibility ex-
cuses actions of subordinates. A brief survey of how international
law, U.S. law, and other Latin American legal systems deal with
these questions follows.
A. International Law: The Nuremberg Trials
At Nuremberg, after World War II, civilian and military au-
thorities of the defeated Axis were tried for violations of interna-
tional criminal law by a tribunal of judges appointed by the Allied
powers. 17 Control Council Law No. 10, setting up the tribunal and
sketching its ground rules, provided: "The fact that any person ac-
ted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not
free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in
mitigation."' 7  Although in principle the Tribunal held a
subordinate completely responsible for his own acts, the fact that
these acts were ordered did, under certain circumstances, allow the
subordinate to claim a defense of duress178 or mistake.171
Conversely, the International Military Tribunal held that
"Those responsible for such [war] crimes by ordering or authoriz-
ing their commission, or by, failfingJ to take effective steps to pre-
vent their execution or recurrence, must be held to account
.... "18o The hard cases all involved the "failure to prevent" part
of this rule. The Tribunal found support in both treaties and na-
tional laws for the proposition that a military commander has an
176. See generally R. WorzL, supra note 8.
177. Control Council Law No. 10, art. II, para. 4(b), reprinted in The High Command
Case, in L. Friedman, supra note 10, at 1421, 1430 [hereinafter High Command Case].
178. Id. at 1431.
179. If the subordinate did not know and should not have known that the order was
illegal, then he lacked the intent necessary for the crime. The Hostage Case, id. at 1303,
1307. For an interesting discussion of the responsibility of a subordinate who, by performing
his otherwise innocent duties, contributes to the efficient functioning of a unit that commits
atrocities, see Massey, Individual Responsibility for Assisting the Nazis in Persecuting Ci-
vilians, 71 MINN. L. REv. 97 (1986).
180. High Command Case, supra note 177, at 1321 (emphasis added).
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affirmative duty to see that his troops obey the laws of war, a duty
that cannot be fulfilled by deliberate ignorance." 1 However, the
Tribunal sought to avoid imputing guilt ex officio:
Criminality does not attach to every individual in this chain of
command from that fact alone. There must be a personal dere-
liction. That can occur only where the act is directly traceable to
him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates
constitutes criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case it
must be a personal neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral dis-
regard of the action of his subordinates amounting to
acquiescence.'
Following these guidelines, the Tribunal traced the transmission of
each illegal order, the rank of each defendant in the German com-
mand structure, and the amount of information available to him. 83
In the Hostage and High Command Cases, the Tribunal resisted
the temptation to use a conspiracy theory to link officers to acts of
their subordinates, in the absence of more direct evidence.'"
B. United States Law
Defenses based on superior orders were generally unsuccessful
in U.S. courts in the nineteenth century.'"5 One early Supreme
Court case held, "[I]t can never be maintained that a military of-
ficer can justify himself for doing an unlawful act by producing the
order of his superior. The order may palliate, but cannot jus-
tify." 86 This position resembles the Nuremberg Tribunal's decla-
ration that superior orders only serve to mitigate. However, by the
time of the controversial trial of Lt. William Calley for Vietnam
War atrocities, the defense had expanded. The military judge in
that trial instructed the jury:
The acts of a subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful
order given him by his superior are excused and impose no crim-
inal liability upon him unless the superior's order is one which a
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1450.
183. See, e.g., id. at 1455-60.
184. Id.
185. See generally JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL's SCHOOL, U.S. ARMy, LAW OF BELLtGER-
ENT OCCUPATION 252-55 (J.A.G.S. Text No. 11, 1945). Examples of trials in which the de-
fense failed are Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804); Trial of Henry Wirz, ExEc. Doc. No.
23, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867-68).
186. Mitchell v. Harmony, 18 How. 115, 137 (1851).
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man of ordinary sense and understanding would, under the cir-
cumstances, know to be unlawful, or if the order in question is
actually known to the accused to be unlawful." 7
This formulation differs from the previous one in two important
ways. First, the proof of superior orders not manifestly illegal goes
beyond mitigating punishment and goes towards negating guilt.
Second, the burden has shifted to the prosecution to establish that
the defendant did know or should have known that the orders were
illegal.1 88 Because a subordinate will be punished for disobeying a
legal order he believed to be illegal, the system encourages him to
err on the side of obedience. 89
Cases confronting the opposite question of command responsi-
bility are rare and very controversial. On December 7, 1945, a U.S.
Military Commission in the recently-liberated Phillipines con-
demned the Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita to death for
atrocities committed by his troops during the final weeks of battle
for the islands. 190 The commission acknowledged that a com-
mander cannot be held responsible for isolated, independent acts
of his troops, but claimed that the Phillipine atrocities differed be-
cause of their widespread nature:
The Prosecution presented evidence to show that the crimes
were so extensive and widespread, both as to time and area, that
they must either have been wilfully permitted by the accused or
secretly ordered by the accused .... With respect to civilian
internees and prisoners of war, the proof offered to the Commis-
sion alleged criminal neglect, especially with respect to food and
medical supplies, as well as complete failure by the higher eche-
lons of command to detect and prevent cruel and inhuman
treatment .... 91
The prosecution presented little evidence to prove that the de-
fendant had actually ordered the atrocities, and the defense
presented a great deal of evidence substantiating that, at the time
the atrocities were committed, Yamashita had little communica-
187. Court Martial of William L. Calley, Jr. (1971), reprinted in L. Friedman, supra
note 10, at 1703, 1722.
188. The jury must find this "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 1723.
189. See the cases cited in L.C. GREEN, SUPERIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 126-53 (1976); N. KEIJZER, MILITARY OBEDIENCE 153-71 (1978).
190. The Yamashita Case, reprinted in L. Friedman, supra note 10, at 1596.
191. Id. at 1596 (emphasis added).
19871
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
tion with or control over his troops. 92 The prosecution and the
Commission apparently reasoned that the widespread nature of
the crimes either supported an inference that Yamashita actually
ordered the crimes or a charge that he could have known of them
and deliberately failed to inform himself or take any action. The
Supreme Court of the United States, in a limited review, affirmed
that criminal liability could be imposed on a commander who
failed to prevent war crimes. 93 The standard was "knew or should
have known," and inferences could be drawn from patterns of
criminal activity and positions in the military structure.
By the time of the Vietnam War, the doctrine of command
responsibility had shifted in the same direction as the defense of
superior orders. At the trial of Captain Medina, Calley's immediate
superior, the judge instructed the jury:
[A] commander is also responsible if he has actual knowl-
edge that troops or other persons subject to his control are in
the process of committing or are about to commit a war crime
and he wrongfully fails to take the necessary and reasonable
steps to insure compliance with the law of war ... these legal
requirements placed upon a commander require actual knowl-
edge plus a failure to act ... the commander-subordinate rela-
tionship alone will not allow an inference of knowledge.' 9
Under this version of the doctrine, a commander can be held re-
sponsible only for ordering atrocities or for actually knowing that
atrocities are occurring and failing to try to prevent them; proof
that he "should have known" is no longer enough." 5
In sum, Anglo-American and international law, as interpreted
at Nuremberg, follow a common approach to hierarchical responsi-
bility. First, the guilt of subordinates and that of superiors are log-
ically independent: both can be guilty of the same act, neither can
be guilty, or one and not the other can be guilty. Second, a
subordinate is in theory completely responsible for his own acts,
192. For an account of the trial and the controversy surrounding it, see R. LAEL, THE
YAMASHITA PREcN7m1. WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND RsPoNstiLiTY (1982).
193. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 16 (1946). The Court declined to review the adequacy
of the evidence about the defendant's control of his troops. Id. at 17.
194. Court Martial of Ernest L. Medina (1971), reprinted in L. Friedman, supra note
10, at 1729, 1732 (emphasis in original).
195. For further analysis of U.S. law as it stood just after the Medina trial, see O'Brien,
The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam, 60 GEo. L.J. 605 (1971-72); Note,
Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 82 YALE L.J. 1272 (1973).
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regardless of orders; however, orders furnish several affirmative de-
fenses that, in practice, encourage obedience. Finally, a superior is
held responsible only if the prosecution proves that he gave illegal
orders or knew of illegal acts. Negligence in failing to inform one-
self is not enough.
C. Latin American Military Codes
Latin American codes, which form part of the civilian legal
family descending from Roman Law, start from a diametrically op-
posite position on hierarchical obedience, but in practice approach
Anglo-American doctrine. The basic principle is that, when a
subordinate commits a crime under a superior's orders, the former
is free of guilt, and liability falls entirely on the latter.' This prin-
ciple can be traced back to Justinian's Digest, which provided that
one who acts upon orders lacks the necessary criminal intent and is
thus guiltless. The true agent is the one who gives the orders.01
The excuse was applied mainly to slaves and children rather than
to soldiers.' Curiously, most Latin American civilian (i.e. non-
military) criminal codes continue to list hierarchical obedience as a
reason for negating the "imputability" of criminal guilt.''e Civil
law resists recognizing group crimes like conspiracy, 00 and labels a
small number of participants as authors of the crime, classifying
the rest as accomplices, with lesser sentences. The guilt of one
group is logically dependent on the lesser guilt of the other.
However, the doctrine of hierarchical obedience is not as abso-
lute as it appears. Even Justinian's scholars withdrew the excuse
196. See generally L.C. GREEN, supra note 189, at 159-228; N. KELIZER, supra note 189,
at 180-225.
197. "Velle non creditur, qui obsequitor imperio patris, vel domini" ("Whosoever acted
upon orders of his father or master is considered not to have acted wilfully"), D. 50, 17, 4;
"Is damnum dat qui iubet dare; eius vero nulla culpa est, qui perere necesse sit" ("He
causes loss who orders it to be caused, but he is without blame who is under the necessity of
obeying"), D. 50, 17, 169.
198. Id.
199. For a survey of provisions of Latin American general penal codes exculpating "due
obedience," see L.C. GREEN, supra note 189, at 216-28. L. Jim6nez de Asda discusses the
theory behind this justification in LA LEY Y EL DELITO, supra note 127, at 406-10. This author
classifies the doctrine as a category of the excuse of mistake. It follows that the subordinate
is not excused if the illegality of the order was so manifest that no mistake was possible. Id.
For a contrary view, see R. MACKAY BARRIGA. EL DELITO DE DESOBEDIENCIA EN EL C6DIGO DE
JUSTICIA MILITAR DE CHILE 130-31 (1965).




for atrocities and for especially heinous crimes. 01 Modern thinkers
maintain that the doctrine does not shelter those who obey mani-
festly illegal orders, who commit excesses in carrying out orders, or
who carry out orders that do not relate to military service.02 The
following is a survey of the specific military code provisions regard-
ing hierarchical responsibility of seven Latin American
countries.203
1. Bolivia
The C6digo Penal Militar of Bolivia provides that one who
"decides on the execution" of a crime and "carries it out by means
of others" shall be considered an author.0 4 Any soldier who acts in
"due obedience to a superior, in acts of service" is completely free
of civil and criminal liability."" But a soldier who refuses to obey
an order is guilty of insubordination; his duty to obey is not lim-
ited to legal orders, but the orders must be "relative to the ser-
vice."""' Conversely, a superior officer may commit "abuse of au-
thority" if he "harasses or allows others to harass . . . aborigines,
shopkeepers, or any other defenseless person .. .-207
2. Brazil
One Brazilian scholar contends that his country's military
code follows the dominio del hecho (in Portuguese, dominio do
fato) theory of authorship used at the junta trial.20 8 In any crime
committed by a group, the cabeqa who organizes the action and
instigates others to carry it out receives an aggravated sentence; if
201. D. 44, 7, 20 and 50, 17, 157 pr; a slave or child who destroys property is only
excused when obeying ius imperandi. D. 9, 2, 37 pr.
202. L. JIM9NEZ DE As0A, supra note 127, at 406-10; R. MACKAY BARRIGA, supra note
199, at 123-32; A. MAYPnNK DA COSTA, CRImE MILT rA 218-20 (1978); F. BENGOA, 1 DERECHO
PENAL MILITAR URUGUAyO 72-76 (1980).
203. The author is well aware that, in every legal system, there are gaps between the
law on the books and the law as applied, particularly in controversial cases such as any trial
of high-ranking military officers. However, it is worthwhile to analyze what the codes say,
both because they reveal much about underlying philosophies of criminal responsibility, and
because the existence of a provision precludes any defense of ex post facto criminal law.
204. C6D. PEN. Mn.. art. 16, inciso 2o (Bolivia), reprinted in 2 MANUAL DE DERECHO
MiLrrAR 142 (C.M. Silva ed. 1969).
205. Id. art. 22, inciso 4o.
206. Id. art. 187, inciso 2o.
207. Id. art. 160, inciso 10o.
208. A. MAYBINK DA COSTA, supra note 202, at 208-11.
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both officers and enlisted men are involved, the law irrebuttably
presumes that the officers are cabeqas.20 9 A soldier's duty to obey
"in matters of the service" is absolute;210 if he does so, he is inno-
cent of criminal guilt unless he committed excesses or the order
was "manifestly criminal." '211 The officer who gave the order is
guilty, even if the subordinate is not.
12
3. Chile
Under Article 334 of the Chilean military code, a soldier must
obey "an order relating to the service that, using his legitimate au-
thority, is given him by a superior."2 "3 The next article, however,
offers the soldier the novel choice of "representation": if he be-
lieves that his superior was not aware of circumstances that make
the order inappropriate or if "the order tends notoriously toward
the perpetration of a crime," he can delay implementing it and no-
tify his superior.1 4 If the superior repeats the order, the
subordinate must "carry it out under the terms of the preceding
article."21
One Chilean legal scholar denies that a soldier is ever obliged
to obey a manifestly illegal order, even after representation and
reconfirmation. He argues that such an illegal order would not be
"relative to the service" or to the superior's "legitimate authority."
The mandate to obey a reiterated order is merely a legal presump-
tion which assumes that, when a subordinate and a superior differ
on the legality of an order, the superior is correct.216 This reason-
ing, however, is not persuasive as an interpretation of the statute.
If the two men honestly differ on the legality of the order, then it
would not be "notoriously" illegal and would not qualify for "rep-
resentation" at all. If all notoriously illegal orders are by definition
not relative to the service, then a subordinate can find his justifica-
tion for disobeying the order in Article 334, and need not "re-
present" under Article 335. The two articles only make sense in
209. Id. at 210; C6D. PEN. Mn.. art. 53 (Brazil), reprinted in LEoGISLAVAO PENAL MILrmAIt
53 (N. Vital Naves ed. 1980).
210. CD. PEN. MiL. art. 163 (Brazil).
211. Id. art. 38(b).
212. Id. art. 38(b)(1).
213. C6D. Jus. Mu.. art. 334 (M. Verdugo Marinkovic ed. 1975)(Chile).
214. Id. art. 335.
215. Id.
216. R. MAcKAY BARRIGA, supra note 199, at 124-32.
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connection with the assumption that the authors of the Code be-
lieved that some manifestly illegal orders would still relate to the
service and an officer's legitimate authority and that a subordinate
should carry out these orders if his commander insists.
4. Colombia
The Colombian military code echoes the Argentine Penal Code
by providing that "one who controls another in committing" a
crime is an author of that crime." 7 The Code lists among its
causas de justificaci6n the fact that a crime was committed "be-
cause of a legal disposition or obligatory order from a competent
authority.12 28 In such case, the superior is responsible.21 ' In the
specific case of a subordinate who commits a crime under a "ser-
vice order," the subordinate may be held responsible only if he en-
gaged in planning the act or committed excesses in carrying it
out.220 The duty to obey a service order is absolute.
22'
5. Mexico
Like its sister codes, the Mexican Code of Military Justice im-
poses a duty to obey all superior orders, except those which, be-
cause of unforeseen circumstances, would tend to endanger the
subjected troops.22 A superior can be punished for giving orders
that "have no relation to the service. 2 s2 3 A subordinate who obeys
a superior order and commits a crime is guiltless unless it was "no-
torious" or the subordinate had actual knowledge of its illegality.24
The Mexican Code draws distinctions not found in the other codes.
If the criminality of an act stems from excesses committed in its
execution, the executors are punished as authors and the com-
manders as accomplices.225 If its criminality derives "directly and
notoriously" from the orders themselves, the commander is pun-
217. "En la misma sanci6n incurrir el que determine a otro a cometerlo." C6D. Jus.
PEN. MIL. art. 18 (E. VAsquez Chac6n ed. 1979)(Colombia).
218. Id. art. 24(1).
219. Id. art. 25.
220. Id. art. 30.
221. Id. art. 39.
222. C6D. Jus. MtL. art. 301 (M. Andrade, ed. 1942)(Mexico).
223. Id. art. 294.
224. Id. art. 119(VI).
225. Id. art. 100(11).
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ished as author and the executors as accomplices.126 If the com-




A Peruvian soldier commits disobedience only when he lacks a
"justified cause" for refusing to obey a service order. s28  A
subordinate who commits a crime under superior orders is free of
guilt unless the orders were "notoriously illicit.' 22  Even if the or-
ders were manifestly illegal, the subordinate's punishment is atten-
uated if he acted "as a consequence of seduction by a superior rely-
ing on influence or authority."2 30 Conversely, a superior can
commit "abuse of authority" not only by ordering illegal acts,251
but also by exerting "pressure on inferiors" to violate the law2 2 or
"omitting, refusing, or delaying" to do his duty. 8 ' The courts
could use this last failure-to-act provision to punish an officer who
put his troops in a position where they were likely to commit
atrocities and then did nothing to prevent them, or who failed to
investigate charges of atrocities. Lastly, the Peruvian Code classi-
fies as authors both those who execute a crime and those who "de-
cide on its execution and carry it out through others."'"
7. Uruguay
The Uruguayan military code established a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a soldier who carries out a crime pursuant to orders
acts under error and is free of guilt.2 35 The commission that
226. Id. art. 110(l).
227. Id. art. 110(111).
228. "Cometen desobediencia los que dejan de cumplir una orden del servicio sin causa
justificada." NUEVA LEY ORnWICA Y C6D. Jus. MiL. art. 158 (S. Martinez G., ed. 1980)(Peru).
229. Id. art. 19(7).
230. Id. art. 20(5).
231. Id. art. 180(3) and (5).
232. Id. art. 180(6).
233. Id. art. 179.
234. Id. art. 14.
235. "Cuando un militar ejecuta un delito en acto de servicio, por orden superior, se
presume que concurren a su respecto las circunstancias que especifica el articulo 29 del
C6digo Penal Ordinario, salvo la prueba en contrario." C61. PEN. Mn.. art. 17 reprinted in I
DERE~iO PENAL MILITAR URUGUAYO 177 (F. B. Bengoa, ed. 1980)(Uruguay). Article 29 of the
civilian criminal code exculpates government officials who act under orders of competent
authority. Id. at 72-73.
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drafted this provision explained:
The supreme rule of the armed forces is subordination .
Obedience must carry almost the force of a dogma.. . . A Greek
philosopher said more than two thousand years ago that an
army of deer commanded by a lion is preferable to an army of
lions commanded by a deer. In civilian life, it is reasonable to
demand that the legality of obedience be proven; in a military
context, it is just that legality be presumed. 3
One Uruguayan commentator has observed that the aim of this
provision is to encourage rapid obedience by giving the soldier the
right to mistakenly believe that an illegitimate order is legiti-
mate.28 7 There is no contrary right to mistakenly believe a legiti-
mate order is illegitimate.
In order to characterize the guilt of several participants in a
crime, the Uruguayan military code remits to the ordinary penal
code, which labels all those who join willfully in the crime as au-
thors.23 8 Presumably, this label would attach to both officers and
subordinates who knew of the illegality of their acts. The statute
implies that the subordinate's actual knowledge is required. In
sum, Latin American military codes purport to completely absolve
subordinates acting under orders. However, it is still possible to
prosecute such soldiers for excesses that went beyond the order,
manifestly illegal acts, or acts that were not related to the service.
For their part, superiors are guilty as principals for ordering sub-
ordinates to commit a crime. Only the Peruvian and Bolivian codes
provide explicit authority for punishing officers who wilfully neg-
lect to prevent crimes by their subordinates.
V. Two THORNY PROBLEMS
A. Subordinate Responsibility
The junta trial, dealing as it did only with commanders-in-
chief, did not settle the question of what to do with the thousands
of subordinates who carried out the massive crimes. These cases
presented a serious political problem to the new civilian govern-
236. Comisifn Designada por el Decreto del 2 de enero de 1935, Exposicifn de motivos
del C6digo Penal Militar, reprinted in id., at 166.
237. Id. at 72-76.
238. C6D. PEN. MIL. art. 7 (Uruguay); C6D. PEN. OsRINARIo art. 59 (Uruguay); F.B.
Bengoa, supra note 235, at 99-100.
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ment: would the armed forces tolerate additional trials of other of-
ficers for human rights violations, including the prosecution of
many still on duty?250 The Alfonsin administration sought to calm
these fears and avert a possible coup, by issuing a directive to the
military prosecutor's office in April, 1986."40 This directive only au-
thorized the prosecution of those officers who ordered or commit-
ted acts that went beyond the criminal plan authorized by the
junta.24 Because the Cmara found that the junta ordered illegal
detentions, torture, torture to death, illegal executions, pillage, and
conversion of real property, the only crimes for which subordinates
could be charged were those the Cimara had characterized as un-
foreseeable or insufficiently proven in relation to the junta com-




This directive was widely protested by human rights groups. 4
It clearly represents a decision to prosecute fewer subordinates
than the law allows. As the previous discussion indicates, the prin-
ciple of obediencia debida (in appearance so absolute), arguably
harbors at least four exceptions. It does not excuse:
(1) the subordinate who actually knew that he was committing
a crime (on the theory that obediencia debida is a form of the de-
fense of error);
(2) the subordinate who should have known that he was com-
mitting a crime, because the acts were atrocities or otherwise mani-
festly criminal;
(3) the subordinate who was ordered to do acts that were man-
ifestly not service acts, as the acts were not related to military ser-
239. Christian, Military Tensions Rise in Argentina, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1986, at
A15, col. 1.
240. El Gobierno fij6 los limites de la obediencia debida, La Naci6n, Apr. 28, 1986, at 1,
Col. 1.
241. For the text of the directive, see Las directivas al fiscal general de las FF.AA., La
Naci6n, Apr. 28, 1986, at 5, col. 1.
242. The Punto final law also specifically allows prosecutions for abduction of minors.
Law 23,492, art. 5, Dec. 23, 1986, 1987-1 Boletin Informativo A.D.L.A. 1.
243. Alternative Found to Military Amnesty: Most Officers Benefit From Obediencia
Debida, Latin Am. Regional Rep.: Southern Cone, May 23, 1986, at 2, col. 2; Military Trials:
Some Cases to be Dismissed, Latin Am. Monitor, May 1986, at 293, col. 1. As discussed
supra notes 172-174 and accompanying text, the Alfonsin government recently persuaded
the Argentine Supreme Court to take another look at "due obedience" in a test case. There
is a good chance that the Court, which previously failed to reach an agreement on "due




vice (derives from the language of obediencia debida statutes and
overlaps with (1) and (2)); and
(4) the subordinate who was high enough in the military hier-
archy to exercise independent decision-making capacity (derives
from the dominio del hecho theory, which states that only fungi-
ble, replaceable instruments are excused). These four exceptions
would offer the civilian authorities ample legal tools to prosecute
lower-level officers. Hence, the Alfonsin government has sought to
foreclose the exceptions.
The larger question is whether any legal system should allow
subordinates to plead superior orders as a defense. This author be-
lieves that the answer is no. It is true that conditions of combat
and danger often require soldiers to obey quickly and, with limited
information on a situation, to determine whether their acts are le-
gal. In such cases, the soldiers who obey the orders should be ac-
quitted if a reasonable man, acting on the same information and
under the same pressures, could have believed that the orders were
legal. The defense should be progressively harder to make as the
soldier rises in rank, because higher ranked soldiers have more in-
formation and greater leeway in carrying out orders.
Further, when a soldier refuses to obey an order which a rea-
sonable man in a similar position would believe to be criminal, he
should have a defense against an accusation of disobedience or in-
subordination. In other words, he should have the same right to err
in disobeying that he has in obeying. To prevent delay and disrup-
tion in carrying out legitimate orders, a soldier should be required
to show that he knew of affirmative facts that would lead a reason-
able man to conclude that the acts ordered were illegal. It would
not be enough for a soldier to claim that he didn't see any justifica-
tion for the order. A superior would not be required to explain an
order or marshall justifications for it, nor would the subordinate be
required to investigate before obeying, unless investigation is part
of his normal duties. However, in cases where relevant facts rea-
sonably lead a subordinate to believe that an order is illegal, he
should have the right to refuse to carry it out.244 Of course, a
subordinate should still be entitled to allege superior orders as part
of a defense of duress, or to mitigate his punishment.
Such reforms are even more necessary today than they were in
244. The right to erroneously believe that an order is illegal is not now granted by
civilian or common-law military codes. See generally, L.C. GaaN, supra note 189, at 17-234.
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World War II. That war was one of the last conventional conflicts
with uniformed, hierarchically-commanded armies fighting each
other in well-defined battles. Since then, the typical war has been
guerrilla style in which the enemy doesn't wear uniforms, conducts
swift terrorist attacks, and takes refuge within the civilian popula-
tion. Organized armies must respond and carry out decentralized
operations in the midst of civilian populations, attempting to dis-
tinguish the insurgents from the innocent bystanders. Field com-
manders and subordinates operate with considerable autonomy.
Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and many other conflicts
evidence the tendency of this difficult type of warfare to breed
atrocities. No one proposes that a soldier should be brought before
a criminal court for making a reasonable mistake in combat. How-
ever, the only way to maintain minimum standards in the midst of
violence is to hold all soldiers responsible, regardless of rank. Oth-
erwise, there would be areas of human activity that are outside the
rule of law. As recent Argentine history demonstrates, such an ex-
ception tends to spread until it swallows up the law.
B. Command Responsibility
Despite the controversy it aroused, the junta trial was a rela-
tively easy case. The commanders-in-chief were accused of ex-
pressly ordering acts that were criminal under Argentine national
law before, during, and after they were committed. Harder cases
arise when superiors give orders that merely imply the commission
of illegal acts; harder still are those cases in which superiors neg-
lect to prevent crimes committed by their subordinates.24 On one
hand, it is unfair to criminally prosecute a desk officer who failed
to investigate crimes occurring on a decentralized and distant bat-
tlefield if the officer instructed his subordinates against atrocities
and received plausible reports that his orders were obeyed. On the
other hand, it seems equally unfair to absolve a commander who
sends his troops into an atrocity-breeding situation without taking
precautions, and then ignores reports that atrocities are taking
place. Apart from other considerations, punishing only subordi-
nates in the latter situation generates disrespect for the law. Lower
ranked soldiers believe that while they receive punishment, the
"brass" do not. Also, the goal of preventing atrocities can only be
245. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1; Note, supra note 195 (discusses a scale of
command responsibility, ranging from direct orders to negligence).
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attained if all those who make them possible know that they face
punishment.
The goals of atrocity prevention, justice, and military effec-
tiveness would be best served by a system that criminalizes both
the giving of expressly criminal orders and gross negligence in
preventing criminal acts. The latter could be found only if the ac-
cused officer had a high score on the following scales:
(1) Knowledge. He knew that crimes were being committed, or
he knew of facts that permitted a strong inference that crimes were
being committed and he failed to draw inferences and investigate
further.
(2) Position. His position in the hierarchy gave him the right
and the duty to take steps to control the actions of those commit-
ting the crimes.
(3) Power. He had both the right and the effectual ability to
take steps to prevent the crimes, such as issuing further orders or
reporting to other officers with authority to act.2"" If an officer
takes such steps, and his orders are countermanded by a higher
officer in the interest of military objectives, the higher officer
should be held guilty if he knew the purpose of the preventative
orders and if a reasonable man would know that atrocities would
result without them.
In addition, every military organization should place the laws
of war on its officer-training curriculum and institute monitoring
and reporting procedures for operations. They should also provide
for lesser sanctions, such as denial of promotion, for officers whose
failure to prevent crimes does not rise to the level of criminal re-
sponsibility. Only a strong, consistent policy can counter the over-
whelming pressure to throw the law aside when dealing with a law-
less enemy.
Perhaps the hardest question is how to deal with civilian au-
thorities. The Argentine juntas had taken all governmental powers;
yet the CAmara refused to accept the prosecution's argument that
each junta, as head of government, should be held collectively re-
sponsible for acts done under its authority. In the Citmara's opin-
ion, each junta member should answer only for his acts as com-
246. This last requirement might have absolved Yamashita, if the defense had been
able to admit evidence that he had lost communication with and control over his troops. R.
LAEL, supra note 192.
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mander-in-chief of his service, not for his acts as a leader of the
government.2' 7 Yet the same arguments that allow responsibility to
climb the chain of command within the military, counsel against
building an absolute barrier against civilian responsibility. Civilian
leaders are usually more removed than high-level officers from in-
formation about, and control over, military operations."" More-
over, a civilian official normally cannot imprison those who disobey
his orders. However, widespread and continuing violation of
human rights, such as prolonged imprisonment of large groups of
people without trial, could not take place without the acquiescence
and active cooperation of civilian authorities. If a particular gov-
ernmental official knowingly acts to further a crime or meets the
knowledge, position, and power tests outlined above for criminal
neglect, his status as a civilian should not absolve him from re-
sponsibility. Of course, both military and civilians should be
judged only for their individual acts; collective responsibility runs




As many nations in Latin America return to democracy, the
question of how to deal with human rights violations by previous
governments will continually arise. One approach, chosen in Uru-
guay and gaining ground in Argentina, is to treat the situation as a
political problem that is beyond the competence of the courts. The
solution, under this approach, is for the legislature to pass an am-
nesty law, often balanced to forgive crimes of both the left and the
right150 Other countries have followed the example of the Argen-
tine junta trials and have instituted procedures in their courts. In
247. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
248. After World War II, U.S. occupation courts condemned members of the Japanese
wartime cabinet for failing to prevent mistreatment of prisoners and other war crimes. In
some cases, civilian officials without direct authority over prisoners were condemned merely
for not resigning in protest. L. Friedman, supra note 10, at 1037-40, 1058-59, 1118-22.
249. The concept of collective guilt for all those who participated in "criminal organiza-
tions" was one of the most- criticized theories used by the prosecution in the Nuremberg
trials. R. WoEFzEL, supra note 8, at 190-217.
250. Uruguay Dithers Over Rights Trials: Public Favors Them; Politicians Demur,
Latin Am. Regional Rep.: Southern Cone, Jan. 31, 1986, at 4, col. 3; Human Rights: Demo-
crats & Dictators: How Southern Cone Countries Decide, Latin Am. Regional Rep.: South-
ern Cone, May 23, 1986, at 4, col. 3; Uruguay Approves a Military Amnesty, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 23, 1986, at 3, col. 4; Uruguay: Human Rights Issue Takes Winding Road, Latin Am.
Regional Rep.: Southern Cone, Dec. 25, 1986, at 3, col. 3.
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Haiti, the trials of ex-Duvalier aides were so disorderly that their
value in affirming the rule of law is questionable.2 51 In Bolivia,
Guatemala, and Peru, courts are taking the first steps toward in-
dicting former military authorities. Analysts believe that some of
these investigations will be shortened due to military pressure and
amnesty laws.2" In the Central African Republic, televising of the
trial of former Emperor Jean Bedel Bokassa converted the pro-
ceeding into a national catharsis.
25 3
Unless these cases are cut short, the judiciary in these coun-
tries will again face the problem of defining superior-subordinate
criminal responsibility. The challenge will be to allocate guilt
among members of a military hierarchy in a way that is just and
that will deter future violations, while avoiding the short cuts of
collective guilt and revenge. This is not a situation unique to the
Third World. 0 4
Given these difficulties, many argue that the only viable solu-
tion must be a politically based one in the form of amnesty laws
instituted by the elected branches of government. According to
this reasoning, no judicial proceeding can escape accusations of
bias and "victors' justice." This argument alleges that courts can
only deal with individual murder, kidnapping, and extortion. They
cannot deal with murders, kidnappings, and extortions carried out
by a system that involves all sectors of society and that continues
251. Treaster, A First in Haiti: Trial of a Duvalier Aide, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1986, at 4,
col. 1; Haitian Court Convicts Duvalier Aide of Murder, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1986, at 4, col.
1; Top Duvalier Aide, at a Rowdy Trial, Condemned to Die, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1986, at 1,
col. 2.
252. Trial of General Garcia Meza, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Jan. 31, 1986, at 5, col. 1
(Bolivia); Bolivia: Trial of 1980 Coup Leaders, Latin Am. Regional Rep.: Andean, Feb. 28,
1986, at 7, col. 3; Bolivia: Garcia Meza Trial, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Apr. 18, 1986, at 12,
col. 1; Guatemala: Cerezo's First Moves Decisive; DIT Demise and Supreme Court Investi-
gation Encourage GAM, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Feb. 21, 1986, at 5, col. 1; Guatemala:
Amnesty, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., June 13, 1986, at 12, col 3; Manz, A Guatemalan Dies,
and What It Means, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1986, at 17, col. 3; Peru: State of Emergency
Declared in Lima, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Feb. 14, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
253. Brooke, In a Gamble, Bokassa Trial is Broadcast Live, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1986,
at 13, col. 1.
254. For example, federal prosecutors recently indicted Shearson Lehman Bros., a fi-
nancial services corporation, for money laundering. Gruson, The Shearson Case Opens New
Ground, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1986, at 21, col. 1. The prosecutors apparently believe that
they need not prove that higher management actually knew of the laundering. "In inter-
views, prosecutors have said only that the pattern of wrongdoing was so obvious that Shear-
son must have known. . . . 'We're putting them on notice that they have [a] duty to super-
vise their personnel.'" Id. The same reasoning might apply to the police chief or mayor in a
city were police brutality is widespread.
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for an extended period. If such a system takes hold, every member
of society will be connected with victims and accomplices and no
one will be independent enough to sit in judgment.
55
This author does not agree with such reasoning. There is a dif-
ference between moral and legal guilt, between the general popula-
tion's failure to act and the participation of those whose affirma-
tive, conscious acts made crimes possible. If law carries any
meaning, criminals must be punished, even if their crimes were
widespread and successful. A nation achieves maturity only when
all of the players in the political field, left, right, and center, agree
that certain ways of fighting are forbidden. A political solution im-
posed by the group currently in power, whether it takes the form
of an amnesty or a purge, tells the group out of power only that it
must get back in by any means, so that it can do the same. The
judiciary, whatever its faults, must have a set of rules and proce-
dures designed to settle disputes according to objective criteria. By
gathering evidence in open hearings and by allowing both sides to
make public argument, it can provide a deeply-divided society with
a cathartic theater. 6
Further developments are taking place as this Article goes to
press. In response to the April 1987 military rebellions, President
Alfonsin pushed through Congress a "Due Obedience Law."257 The
law imposes an irrebuttable presumption that officers at or below
the rank of lieutenant colonel during the "dirty war" qualify for
the due-obedience defense.2 58 Officers above that rank can still be
prosecuted if they had either "decisional capacity" or "participated
in formulating orders."25  The Argentine Supreme Court, by a
four-to-one vote, upheld the law as constitutional a few weeks
255. Some of the defendants in the junta trial and its companion cases made these
points. El general Camps niega autoridad moral a la Cdmara Federal para que lo juzgue,
La Naci6n, Mar. 10, 1986, at 4, col. 1; Videla declinb formular su descargo, Clarin, Oct. 25,
1985, at 7, col. 1; Lami Dozo: Argentine Society Should be on Trial, Buenos Aires Herald,
Oct. 22, 1985, at 1.
256. Ronald Dworkin speaks of the healing effect of the junta trial on Argentine society
in Report from Hell, N.Y. Rev. of Books, July 17, 1986, at 11, col. 1.
257. Law 23.521, reprinted in Texto del proyecto sobre obediencia debida aprobado
por el Senado, La Naci6n, June 1,1987, at 5, col. 4; see also, Qued6 sancionada ta ley de
obediencia debida, La Nacibn, June 8,1987, at 1, col. 1.
258. Law 23.521, supra note 257. Note that the newly-created presumption applies only
to "dirty-war" defendants, not to military defendents in general.
259. "(C]apacidad decisoria o participaci6n en Is elaboraci6n de 6rdenes." Id., art. 10.




In the next few weeks, the courts dismissed dozens of cases,
but retained an estimated fifty.261 Alfonsin announced a restruc-
turing of the military and a reform of the Code of Military Justice,
including article 514, the due-obedience provision.262 Thus, the
long-term definition of due obedience is yet unsettled, and the of-
ficers still subject to trial will no doubt hotly contest the meaning
of "decisional capacity" under the new law. Many political and le-
gal questions remain unresolved.
260. Es constitucional la ley de obediencia debida, La Naci6n, June 29, 1987, at 1, col.
1.
261. Se aplic6 la ley de obediencia debida, La Naci6n, June 22, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Uru-
guay & Argentina tackle amnesty issue, Latin Am. Regional Rep.: Southern Cone, July 2,
1987 at 4, col. 3; Obediencia debida: No incluyen a 26 oficiales, La Naci6n, July 13, 1987, at
1, col. 1 (26 cases remain in Buenos Aires federal court).
262. Obediencia debida bill to end some trials, continue with others, Latin Am. Re-
gional Rep.: Southern Cone, May 23, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
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